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Abstract
The WTO Doha negotiations are often referred to as a “development round.” Yet
that characterization is controversial, due to weaknesses in the Doha Declaration
and limited progress in the early negotiations. This paper offers a comprehen-
sive assessment of the Doha Round from the perspective of development policy.
It draws on recent summit-level commitments on development, initiatives by de-
velopment organizations, and policy analyses by scholars and NGOs. Together,
these instruments establish a coherent and highly legitimate set of global norms
on development. Trade negotiations like Doha are poorly suited to many aspects
of development policy. Yet they can still make major contributions: e.g., by mod-
ifying trade rules that impede development, giving priority to issues of concern
to developing countries (DCs), allowing DCs to implement market reforms grad-
ually while developing appropriate social policies and institutions, and providing
for full DC participation in WTO affairs. Thus, the WTO should not leave devel-
opment policy to multilateral development banks and other specialized organiza-
tions, but rather should strengthen its collaboration with them to more effectively
promote development. The paper identifies two schools of thought on reform
of the trade regime among development specialists. (1) An ”enlightened standard
view” emphasizes access to Northern markets for DC exports, especially in sectors
like labor-intensive manufactures and agriculture; complementary policy changes
within DCs (including market reforms and social policies); aid for trade and re-
form; and improved WTO participation. (2) A more critical view also calls for
rebalancing TRIPs and other agreements, enhancing special and differential treat-
ment (SDT), exempting DCs from inappropriate institutional requirements, and
acting on important issues like food security and access to medicines. The Doha
Declaration authorized negotiations on some issues in both groups, while giving
unprecedented rhetorical prominence to development. However, it failed to act on
other issues, or did so only in limited ways, e.g., by requiring new DC concessions
as the price of rule modifications. The first 18 months of negotiations have also
been troubling: Stalemates on agriculture and other central issues have thrown
the timetable of the Round into doubt, and governments appear reluctant to give
concrete effect to the rhetoric of the Declaration, deadlocking on SDT, TRIPs and
public health, and other development issues, mainly along North-South lines. The
paper concludes by outlining strategies of political action that advocates might
adopt to restore development concerns to the heart of the Round. These include
hard bargaining at the Cancun ministerial meeting and in other settings, invocation
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FOREWORD
Trade is a major engine for growth and a powerful tool for povertyreduction. The new round of multilateral trade negotiations
launched in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar, offers great potential for
developing countries through (i) increased market access and further
liberalization of their own markets, and (ii) improved rules and
procedures governing international trade. The new round is widely
called a “development round” as it promises to place development at
the heart of trade negotiations and ensure that the outcomes of the
negotiations advance developing countries’ interests and concerns. As
a regional development institution, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
strives to help its developing member countries make the most of such
new development opportunities by actively participating in multilateral
trade negotiations.
The broad objective of ADB’s research program on “The Doha
Round and Development” is to promote policy dialogue on priority
areas and identify information and positions that will more effectively
advance developing countries’ interests in the new round of multilateral
trade negotiations. The program has three interrelated components
aimed at (i) examining the agenda of the Doha Round in the context of
ongoing debates on trade and development, (ii) assessing the
development potential from trade liberalization (i.e., in goods and
services), and (iii) addressing trade-related issues of relevance to the
Doha Round and future negotiations under the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
All the papers prepared under the research program will be
disseminated through conferences and publications. We anticipate that
these studies will enhance our understanding of the “Doha
Development Agenda,” and contribute to the efforts by the
international trade and development communities to make the Doha
Round truly a development round.
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iv
This paper by Prof. Kenneth W. Abbott is part of the research
program. It offers a comprehensive assessment of the Doha Round
from the perspective of development policy. While acknowledging that
trade negotiations are poorly suited to many aspects of development,
it argues that trade institutions can still make major contributions, as
by removing impediments to development within trade rules and giving
priority to issues of developing country concern. Thus, the WTO
should not leave development policy to the multilateral development
banks and other specialized organizations, but rather should strengthen
its collaboration with them. The paper identifies two schools of thought
on reform of the trade regime among development specialists: an
“enlightened standard view” that emphasizes market access and
domestic reforms, and a critical view that calls for rebalancing the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and other agreements, special and differential treatment (SDT)
for developing countries, and strong action on food security and access
to medicines. The Doha Declaration authorized negotiations on some
issues in both groups, but it failed to act on many others or did so only
in limited ways. The first 18 months of negotiations are even more
troubling: stalemates on agriculture and other central issues have
thrown the timetable of the Round into doubt, and governments appear
reluctant to give concrete effect to the rhetoric of the Declaration,
deadlocking on SDT, implementation, TRIPS and public health, and
other development issues, mainly along North-South lines. The paper
concludes by outlining strategies of political action that advocates might
adopt to restore development concerns to the heart of the Round.
IFZAL ALI
Chief Economist
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The Doha negotiations are often referred to as a “developmentround.” Yet that characterization is controversial, due to weaknesses
in the Doha Declaration and limited progress in the early negotiations.
This paper offers a comprehensive assessment of the Doha Round
from the perspective of development policy. It draws on recent summit-
level commitments on development, initiatives by development
organizations, and policy analyses by scholars and nongovernment
organizations. Together, these instruments establish a coherent and
highly legitimate set of global norms to guide future actions.
Traditional trade negotiations are poorly suited to many aspects
of development policy. Yet trade policy and institutions like the World
Trade Organization (WTO) can still make major contributions: removing
trade rules that impede development; placing a high priority on trade
issues of concern to developing countries (DCs); allowing DCs to
implement market reforms gradually and to develop appropriate social
policies and institutions; and guaranteeing full DC participation in WTO
affairs. The WTO should not leave development policy to development
banks and other specialized organizations, but rather should strengthen
its collaboration with them to more effectively promote development.
Development policy contains two major schools of thought on
trade reform:
The “enlightened standard view” emphasizes increased access to
Northern markets for DC exports, especially in sectors like labor-
intensive manufactures and agriculture where the barriers are high and
the potential payoffs great; increased access to other DC markets;
complementary policy changes within DCs, including both market
reforms and social policies; aid for trade and domestic reform; and
improved DC participation in WTO governance.
Critical views go further. They also call for rectifying imbalances
in WTO agreements like the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services; reframing “reciprocity” to reflect different levels of
development; enhancing special and differential treatment (SDT) for
measures to promote development; exempting DCs from
inappropriate domestic institutional requirements; and acting on crucial
issues like access to medicines and food security.
The Declaration authorized negotiations on some of these issues,
especially market access, aid for trade, SDT, and the “implementation
agenda,” while giving unprecedented rhetorical prominence to
development. But it failed to address other issues, including DC
domestic reform, imbalances in agreements like TRIPS, institutional
requirements, and WTO governance. It required new concessions for
most actions on SDT and implementation, and left issues like
technology transfer to soft procedures.
The first 18 months of negotiation are even more troubling, in
spite of promising proposals in areas like food security and market
access for least-developed countries. Negotiators have deadlocked on
major subjects, notably agriculture (market access, domestic support,
and export subsidies) and contingent protection, throwing the timetable
of the Round into doubt. Negotiators also appear reluctant to give effect
to the development commitments in the Declaration. Discussions on
SDT, implementation, TRIPS and public health, and other important
subjects are stalemated, primarily along North-South lines.
DCs and development advocates must engage in focused political
action to restore development concerns to the heart of the Round. Two
political strategies are available. First, advocates can engage in hard
bargaining. The best opportunity will come at the Cancun Ministerial
in September 2003, where industrialized countries will seek a mandate
for negotiations on the Singapore issues (investment, competition,
trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement).
Bargaining can turn on norms and principles as well as trade-offs: here
advocates must seek to persuade Northern governments to implement
the development commitments they so solemnly endorsed around the
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art25
xturn of the Millennium. Second, advocates can engage in public
diplomacy, appealing to wider publics to garner support for
development initiatives. Advocates must demonstrate to concerned
citizens in the North how development can benefit them, and must
mobilize public pressure on Northern governments to fulfill their
development commitments. The ADB’s research program on the
Doha Round and Development can play a significant role in stimulating
public discussion.
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INTRODUCTION
The Doha Round of trade negotiations under the World TradeOrganization (WTO) is often characterized as a “development
round.” Launched in November 2001, the Round has been paralleled
by increased attention to development issues in the rhetoric of the
WTO and in its operations, especially in the area of technical assistance.
A sustained turn to development in the trade regime would be especially
beneficial for Asia, where some 900 million people live on less than $1
per day.
Yet characterizing Doha as a “development round” is
controversial. Critics note that many developing country (DC) initiatives
(e.g., proposals for a “development box” in the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture [AoA] and for duty- and quota-free market access for
products of least-developed countries [LDCs]) were either rejected or
addressed only in hortatory form in the Ministerial Declaration adopted
at Doha (Declaration) (reprinted for convenience in Annex 1 [WTO
2001b]). On a number of other issues the “Doha development agenda”
(DDA) does address DC concerns (e.g., special and differential treatment
[SDT] and the implementation agenda). Even here, however, much of
the Declaration’s promise has faded during the first 18 months of
negotiations, which have seen repeated stalemates on important issues
between DCs and industrialized countries (ICs). Critics assert that the
“development round” label is mere rhetoric, or worse (e.g., Public
Citizen 2002).
This paper assesses the DDA from the perspective of
development. It is neither feasible nor appropriate to review here the
full range of debates over development. However, in order to assess
the potential contributions of the Round to “development,” it is
essential to move beyond trade policy as such and examine the insights
of development policy.
The past decade has produced a remarkable flowering of
development policy initiatives. These provide clear criteria for assessing
the DDA and progress in the Round. I draw on recent sources in three
categories:
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2(1) summit-level commitments to combat global poverty;
(2) policy initiatives by international organizations with a
development mandate, including the multilateral
development banks (MDBs), other international
development organizations (IDOs) like the United Nations
Development Programme, and specialized bodies like the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); and
(3) analyses by development theorists and nongovernment
organizations (NGOs).
Many of these instruments focus explicitly on the relationship
between development and trade. While none is legally binding, together
they constitute a coherent and legitimate set of global norms on
development, solemnly endorsed at the highest levels of government.
Part I of the paper summarizes recent international commitments
and policy statements on development. Part II explores the focus on
poverty reduction, and the complex views of poverty and its causes,
that characterize modern development policy. The final section of Part
II considers the implications of these views for development policy, and
outlines the complementary roles that IDOs and trade institutions like
the WTO can play.
Part III summarizes features of the international trade regime that
development advocates most frequently criticize. Part IV lays out two
schools of thought on reform of the trade regime: an expanded version
of what Dani Rodrik calls the new “enlightened standard view” and a
more aggressive critique. Both emphasize changes in traditional trade
policy as well as more far-reaching reforms. Part V assesses the DDA
and the early stages of the Round from these perspectives, highlighting
elements that development advocates in Asia and other regions should
emphasize or seek to change. The Conclusion summarizes the findings
in the paper and suggests political strategies for the remainder of the
Round.
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3I.  A NEW PROMINENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Development policy moved near the top of the international
agenda around the turn of the Millennium.
 United Nations (UN) agencies sponsored a series of world
summits on aspects of development. Heads of state and
government adopted detailed (though not legally binding)
commitments, declaring that “poverty in all its forms is the
greatest challenge to the international community.” Most
prominently, the Millennium Development Goals set
ambitious poverty reduction targets.
 IDOs launched comprehensive development initiatives.
Examples include the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB)
1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy and the World Bank’s
World Development Report 2000/2001 “Attacking
Poverty.”
 Scholarly and popular writings by academic and policy
specialists and campaigns by prominent NGOs like Oxfam
– as well as highly publicized protests against the negative
and uneven effects of globalization – stimulated wide public
debate.
The reasons for this attention are easy to identify. Shocking
statistics on global poverty – with 1.15 billion people (most of them in
Asia) living on less than $1/day, and nearly half the world’s population
on less than $2 – focused public attention.1 The scale of poverty was
dramatized by contrast with the promise of globalization. The HIV/
AIDS2 pandemic and regional conflicts threatened to magnify the
development crisis. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and
their aftermath have distracted leaders and publics from these concerns.
Yet thoughtful people still recognize that poverty and inequality produce
social tensions that translate into support for radical governments and
terrorism.
1 The Millennium itself, with its links to religious and humanitarian traditions of charity, provided
a focal point for public attention.
2 Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
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4Political undertakings should not be confused with concrete
programs, let alone with results. Yet the profusion of development
commitments provides a powerful political and normative backdrop to
the Round. In the Millennium Declaration, leaders pledged to “spare
no effort” against poverty and to make the “right to development” a
reality for all, pledging to halve extreme poverty by 2015. World
leaders have regularly reiterated this goal, most recently at
Johannesburg in 2002. At the 2002 World Food Summit + 5, leaders
renewed a parallel commitment to halve the number of hungry people
by 2015. At the 2002 Monterrey conference on financing for
development, leaders undertook to make the 21st century a period of
“development for all,” addressing social and economic development
in advancing to a “fully inclusive and equitable global economic
system.”3
II.  A COMPLEX VIEW OF “DEVELOPMENT”
A. Development and Poverty
The reduction of poverty, especially extreme poverty, is now
accepted as the central goal of development policy. But “poverty” is
understood to be more complex than “low income;” it has multiple
dimensions and its persistence has multiple causes. The ADB Strategy
notes “universal agreement” that poverty transcends low income. The
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines for Poverty
Reduction of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) similarly see poverty as “multidimensional” and
undertake “to fight poverty in all its dimensions.”4 The complexity of
the modern view is reflected in the phrase “human development.”5
Among the many facets of “poverty,” the following stand out:
4 The DAC is designed to coordinate and improve the development assistance programs of OECD
member states, and draws primarily on their experience. However, in preparing Guidelines, the
DAC draws on IDOs and individual experts, including some from DCs.
5 Even “human development” does not fully encompass the relationship between development and
the environment, highlighted in the term “sustainable development.” Sustainability has also been
the subject of high-level global commitments, notably at the 1992 Rio conference on environment
and development and the 2002 follow-up conference at Johannesburg, and in many of the instruments
considered here.
3 These global commitments have been echoed in regional forums. For example, ADB (1999)
declares: “Poverty is an unacceptable human condition….  Public policy can, and must, eliminate
poverty.”
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51. Limited economic opportunity. The poor not only have
low incomes and assets; they face limited opportunities to
increase their wealth. As a result, development policy
cannot merely stimulate economic growth; it must promote
sustained pro-poor growth. To do this, policy must
guarantee the poor property rights, access to productive
assets, and social arrangements that allow them to
participate in economic opportunities. Market-oriented
reforms are essential, but they must be undertaken with
care to ensure that they benefit the poor (e.g., by providing
jobs at appropriate skill levels and in appropriate locations),
reflect local conditions, and are buffered by social safety
nets.
Residents of the LDCs face unique constraints. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) describes LDCs as caught in a self-reinforcing
“poverty trap,” resulting mainly from their dependence on
primary commodities, that causes extreme, pervasive
poverty to persist. Such conditions demand special
measures.
2. Multiple deprivations. In addition to its economic aspects,
“poverty” encompasses a number of distinct deprivations,
including hunger and malnutrition, unsafe water, poor
sanitation, disease, and inadequate education. The
Millennium Development Goals, the ADB Strategy, and
other instruments recognize that development policy must
include focused responses. These can be most effectively
provided through, or in cooperation with, specialized bodies
like the FAO and World Health Organization (WHO).
3. Constrained choice and power. Poor people (and their
governments) are relatively powerless, facing severe limits
on freedom of choice and action in all walks of life. Public
policy is more likely to be pro-poor if the poor participate
actively in shaping it. Thus, “governance,” domestic and
international, has become a major focus of development
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art25
66 Although not identified as a “pillar,” the ADB strategy also calls for addressing the development
implications of environmental problems and the environmental implications of anti-poverty
strategies.
policy. The DAC Guidelines, for example, call for action on
the “qualitative aspects of poverty,” including accountable
governance and human rights, with the goal of a just,
participatory society.
4. Vulnerability. The poor are vulnerable to shocks of all
kinds, including economic upheavals, natural disasters,
outbreaks of disease, and upsurges of violence.
Development policy must address the “downside” of
vulnerability, through safety nets and other social
protections, as well as the “upside” of economic
opportunity.
5. Inequality. Discrimination and unequal treatment on the
basis of racial, ethnic, gender, and other differences
heighten all the dimensions of poverty for those affected.
While these phenomena are characteristics of poverty, they also
reflect the multiple causal factors – economic, political, and social –
that contribute to its persistence.
B. “Poverty” and Development Policy
What policies are needed to attack the complex phenomenon
of poverty? Development specialists and IDOs agree that effective
development strategies must be comprehensive. Almost all now accept
that market reforms, trade, and competition are essential to provide
opportunities for pro-poor growth and address other problems. But
market reforms must be shaped and supported by innovative policies
and institutions in a range of issue areas.
The 1999 ADB Strategy incorporates a comprehensive
approach aimed at producing “socially inclusive development.” It
includes three main “pillars:”6 (a) sustainable, pro-poor growth, coupled
with policies to mitigate inequality; (b) social development; and (c) good
governance, including sound macroeconomic policy. The DAC
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7Guidelines add that global policies on economic, governance, social,
and environment reform must be coherent and mutually reinforcing.
Similarly, the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000/
2001 endorses a three-pronged strategy:
(a) enhance economic opportunity: stimulate pro-poor
economic growth; build the assets of the poor; introduce
market reforms that reflect local conditions; and create
safety nets to protect market losers;
(b) empower the poor: guarantee access to markets and
social services; promote institutional accountability and
political participation; and eliminate institutional and social
barriers to participation by disfavored groups; and
(c) enhance security: reduce the vulnerability of the poor to
shocks.
C. Development and Trade Policy
If development policy is to be comprehensive, encompassing
measures to stimulate economic growth and sound social and
governance policies, “trade” and “development” can no longer be
isolated, intellectually, politically, or institutionally.7 The DDA suggests
that the trade community has recognized the need to integrate these
fields. Yet the many criticisms of WTO policies indicate that this
integration is far from complete.
What role can trade policy and institutions play in development?
The traditional mode of operation in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)/WTO is the exchange of “concessions,” as in
negotiations on tariffs and “specific commitments” under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). A more recent mode is the
adoption of rules and procedures that all member states must
implement domestically, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). As Finger (2002)
observes, neither approach is well suited to address development
7 The concept of sustainable development requires a similar integration of economic and environmental
policy (Abbott 1996a).
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8problems, which involve multiple issues, vary across countries, and
require operational programs and distinct forms of expertise as well
as significant resources.
Yet trade policy can make valuable contributions to a
comprehensive development policy, even beyond its direct role in
stimulating economic growth and its important indirect role in
weakening concentrations of economic and political power.
First, trade institutions can reduce or eliminate impediments that
current trade rules and commitments pose to pro-poor growth,
appropriate social protections, responses to shocks, food security,
health programs, and similar development initiatives.
Second, it can ensure that issues important to DCs and LDCs
are given the same priority as issues of concern to ICs. Examples
include enhancing returns from LDC commodity exports and providing
intellectual property protection for traditional knowledge.
Third, it can provide flexibility, through SDT, transitional rules,
and other devices, for DCs to gradually implement market reforms,
install social safety nets, and design policies and institutions attuned to
local conditions. Trade institutions can support such measures through
technical assistance (TA) and other approaches. To monitor national
policies and contain moral hazard, they can adapt procedures like the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism and collaborate with IDOs and other
actors with superior local knowledge.
Fourth, trade institutions can apply the lessons of governance
reform, ensuring that their own procedures allow for full participation
by DCs to represent the interests of their populations. Trade institutions
can also support domestic governance reform.
Fifth, and most general, trade institutions can become advocates
for development, in their own operations and in other national and
international arenas.
None of these actions requires trade institutions to transmute
themselves into wholly different organizations. Yet some require them
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9to consider relatively unfamiliar norms and types of information, and
to address issues at the margins of their traditional mandate. To do so
effectively, trade institutions should actively draw on the epistemic
community of development specialists.8 They should significantly
strengthen their collaboration with MDBs, other IDOs, and other key
actors in the development community, notably transnational and local
development NGOs.9
These organizations are deeply familiar with the norms of
development policy embodied in recent international instruments. IDOs
possess superior information and expertise on issues such as
impediments to pro-poor growth, social protections, commodity trade
problems, increases in supply capacity, and economic policies
responsive to local conditions. Their expertise is country-specific as well
as general. They also possess a major structural advantage: networks
of knowledgeable field personnel working in DCs.
Trade institutions could draw on these strengths in many ways.
In authorizing SDT and monitoring its use, they could utilize information
about national circumstances and policies collected by IDOs, NGOs,
and even business firms. In negotiating market access, they could
phase in liberalization commitments based on information about DC
progress toward food security or supply capacity provided by bodies
like FAO and ADB. In developing behind the border rules like those in
TRIPS, they could consult with organizations like WHO and FAO to
ensure that proposed rules will not retard health, food security, or other
facets of development.
Collaboration with trade institutions would also enhance the work
of IDOs. It would provide them early, superior information on trade
problems of DCs, trade opportunities emerging from negotiations,
potential disputes, and the like. This would help IDOs focus attention
and resources on areas of change and opportunity. Collaboration would
8 The concept of an “epistemic community” is a network of individuals and organizations united
by common forms of knowledge (Haas 1992).
9 The WTO has entered into formal collaboration with a number of IDOs, mainly to provide TA.
Examples include the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance, the Joint
Integrated Technical Assistance Program for African Countries, and an April 2003 Memorandum
of Understanding with UNCTAD.
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also improve IDOs’ understanding of trade rules and procedures. Due
to past failures of collaboration, IDOs may have required DCs to forfeit
some of the flexibility in WTO rules, unnecessarily constraining
development policies (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development [ICTSD]/International Institute for Sustainable
Development [IISD] 2003j, 2). With closer collaboration, they could help
DCs comply and participate in the most favorable way. Finally,
collaboration would improve the coordination of financial assistance
and TA with current needs.
III.  OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPMENT IN THE WTO
Virtually every recent development instrument identifies features
of the international trade regime as obstacles to development and
poverty alleviation. Organizations that on the whole support
globalization and market reforms, like the MDBs, and groups that are
more skeptical, like Oxfam, advance similar criticisms, although the
skeptics interpret them more negatively.10 This section summarizes the
principal concerns.
A. Market access, DC manufactures exports
Although most DCs have diversified into manufactures, these
products face high barriers abroad. DC exports face higher average
tariffs than IC exports both in ICs and in other DCs; they also face
tariff peaks and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The obstacles are highest
precisely where DCs have the greatest comparative advantage and
where trade would have the greatest impact on poverty: labor-intensive,
low-skill manufactures. At the same time, tariff escalation constrains
DCs from moving up to higher value-added production.
Textiles and clothing remain highly protected. The Uruguay
Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing allows “back-loaded” quota
liberalization. Importing countries can select which products to liberalize
at each stage. Because they typically select the least competitive
10 For example, Oxfam charges that imbalances in WTO obligations exacerbate fundamental causes
of poverty to the point of undermining the legitimacy of the trade regime.
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categories, “lumpy” liberalization will be required in the final stages if
WTO members are to comply with the agreement. DCs fear that this
will lead to calls for delay or the substitution of contingent protection
for quotas.11 Textile tariffs also remain high.
Preferential access schemes like the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) provide limited benefit. Tariff reductions have eroded
preference margins. GSP benefits are also limited by rules of origin and
graduation rules, and by NTBs. Time-limited preference authorizations
reduce incentives to invest in reliance on preferences.
B. Market access, DC agricultural exports
IC tariffs on agricultural products are double those on
manufactures, and include many peaks. Here DCs face lower average
tariffs than IC exporters, because tropical products are not highly
protected, but exporters of temperate products still face high barriers.
DC exports again face higher average tariffs in other DCs. The AoA
required tariffication of quotas, but this has led to high equivalent rates,
only modestly alleviated by a system of tariff-rate quotas. Here too,
tariff escalation limits moves to higher value-added products.
Government support for agriculture remains high in ICs,
animated by emerging rationales like “multifunctionality” and the
continuing influence of farm interests. ICs may continue such support
under exemptions in the AoA, like the green and blue “boxes” tailored
to existing programs. Domestic support displaces DC exports to
subsidizing countries and to third markets. The recent United States
(US) farm bill, which significantly increases support, will worsen the
situation in the near term. The US could use this law as a bargaining
chip in the Round, but this outcome is uncertain12 and its effects would
not be felt for some time.
11 As Finger (2002) points out, many DC exporters have been receiving scarcity rents, in the form
of higher prices, from the continued existence of import quotas. However, this benefit is not shared
by firms shut out of foreign markets when quotas are filled, or by firms and countries prevented
or deterred by quotas from entering or expanding in the sector.
12 The US farm bill appears not to have been adopted with this goal in mind, but rather for more
traditional electoral and political ends. Among the latter, the bill may have been part of a deal
to obtain Congressional support for trade promotion authority, allowing the Executive branch of
government to participate in the Round and other trade negotiations, like those leading to the
recent free trade agreement with Singapore.
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C. Market access, DC services exports
Services constitute the fastest growing sector in DCs. However,
DCs’ main comparative advantage is in labor-intensive services like
construction. GATS created largely symmetrical obligations for capital-
and labor-intensive services: with some exceptions, all sectors and
modes of provision are subject to the same general rules and system
of negotiated specific commitments. In practice, though, few ICs have
been willing to accept significant numbers of low-skilled service
workers. The possibility of a grand North-South services bargain, then,
has not been realized. Heightened concerns for security following 9/11 will
only increase IC reluctance to liberalize.
D. DC import issues, agriculture
OECD countries spend over $1 billion a day on agricultural
support, most of it in the European Union (EU), Japan, and US. Across
the OECD, support makes up 40% of farm income, the same as in
the mid-1980s. While many support programs are now linked to
farmer incomes, production cutbacks, environmental compliance, and
other relatively benign activities, they continue to stimulate massive
overproduction, much of which must be diverted to world markets,
often on a subsidized basis (Priyadarshi 2002).
Subsidized and low-priced exports can benefit net food importing
DCs, especially in the short term. But they can also have serious
adverse effects. Agriculture is the dominant way of life for many DC
populations, and a major source of foreign exchange. Low import
prices and import surges can devastate small farmers and local markets.
This hampers development strategies based on small-holder agriculture
and rural growth, and worsens urban problems by forcing migration
to cities. Many DCs cannot adequately protect local food producers
because they bound tariffs on staple crops in the Uruguay Round, and
because they do not qualify for the special safeguard measure in the
AoA.
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E. DC import issues, services
Services imports can stimulate development and satisfy consumer
demand. Most services liberalization in DCs has stemmed from these
considerations. However, development policy suggests that
liberalization must be handled with care. If local firms are to retain a
share of the market, governments may need to eliminate barriers to
local entry and strengthen local firms to compete with foreign entrants.
In addition, regulation of service providers is essential in many sectors
to guarantee the poor equal and adequate access, for economic and
social reasons; however, DCs often lack regulatory capacity.
These concerns are reflected in the debate over opening public
services like drinking water to private foreign providers.13 Critics voice
concern that such providers might not be required to guarantee
affordable access for the poor, and that many DC governments could
not monitor and enforce such guarantees even if they were given. Yet
poor people in many DCs already suffer from inadequate access to
water and similar services, as well as discriminatory pricing. Private
provision could improve service and discipline public agencies through
competition. Different settings may require different arrangements.
F. Intellectual property issues
Development advocates criticize TRIPS more strongly than any
other WTO agreement. First, TRIPS shifts the balance of benefits from
intellectual property rights (IPRs) strongly in favor of ICs, where the
vast majority of intellectual property is produced. TRIPS will result in
higher prices for technological inputs, transferring significant rents from
South to North.
Second, TRIPS imposes a “one size fits all” model of domestic
IPR rules and institutions, albeit with some flexibility.14 In the long
term, appropriate IPRs can help DCs stimulate investment and
innovation, at least given sound policies in other areas. But IDOs argue
persuasively that different forms of IPR protection are appropriate for
countries at different stages of development.
14 Finger (2002) notes that the agreement itself provides some flexibility, and more is available in
practice.
13 The WTO argues that this is a false issue, since GATS exempts services provided by governments.
However, this exemption would disappear if such services were wholly or partially privatized.
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15 These undertakings typically take the form of “time-limited derogations from the rules, with more
favourable treatment regarding tariff and subsidy reduction commitments, thresholds in the application
of countervailing measures, and limited policy flexibility for specific obligations” (ICTSD/
IISD 2003k, 1).
Third, the domestic institutions and procedures TRIPS requires
can impose high costs on DCs. Investment in IPR administration
diverts scarce public funds from more pressing development needs.
Advocates level similar criticisms at other WTO agreements that (would)
require domestic institutions based on IC models, such as the Customs
Valuation Agreement and the proposed agreement on trade and
competition policy.
Finally, critics raise several specific concerns. The most pressing
problem is to ensure that IPRs do not block affordable access to
medicines in DCs suffering from HIV/AIDS and other major health
threats. Apart from their human cost, these epidemics act as a major
drag on development (WHO 2001). The Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (TRIPS Declaration) did much to
address the problem. As this is written, however, negotiations to extend
the TRIPS Declaration have deadlocked. Another problem is lack of
protection for genetic information in plants and other living things, and
more broadly for indigenous, often collective knowledge. Some say this
issue should not be on the WTO agenda because it is not “trade-related.”
Yet the problem is precisely that multinational firms seek to acquire
such knowledge in order to produce tradable (and IPR-protected)
products, without sharing the benefits.
G. Reciprocity
Development specialists argue that it is difficult to address
development in a system based heavily on reciprocal concessions and
on uniformly applicable rules and administrative requirements. The rules
of the WTO do include numerous provisions granting SDT during
negotiations and to some extent in the application of rules.15 Still, a
fundamental commitment to reciprocity and universal application leads
trade institutions to downplay large differences in capacity, resources,
and power among states. This can lead to serious rule imbalances that
can hamper development, as in the case of TRIPS.
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DCs viewed the SDT provisions in WTO agreements as
consideration for accepting intrusive new rules in areas like IPRs,
services, and investment. They expected that SDT would provide
greater access to IC markets and policy flexibility at home. However,
while the basic rules are legally binding and subject to the WTO dispute
settlement system, most SDT undertakings are neither mandatory nor
legally enforceable, and hence did not produce the anticipated benefits.
DCs have also identified numerous other “imbalances” in WTO
agreements, collected in the implementation agenda. Both of these
issues are part of the DDA.
H. Participation and governance
It is widely agreed that WTO governance does not afford DCs
sufficient participation and influence, although the organization has
made significant strides on “internal transparency” and participation.
Advocates raise three major concerns. First, many DCs lack the
resources and administrative capacity to process information on the
range of complex issues handled within the WTO, while dealing with
development and the demands of other regimes. This limits their ability
to frame goals, negotiating strategies and positions, respond to
proposals, litigate disputes, and implement complex agreements.
Second, some LDCs lack representation in Geneva, although the WTO
has developed programs to help them compensate. Finally, ICs still
dominate WTO decision-making, even when DCs participate.16 The
Doha ministerial included some procedural reforms, but these have not
allayed the concerns of DCs or NGOs.17
IV.  POLICY RESPONSES
A. The “Enlightened Standard View”
The political economy insights reflected in current
understandings of “poverty” and the perceived failings in international
trade policy lead development specialists and IDOs to advocate
16 Steinberg (2002) has recently analyzed how powerful states can control decision-making in a
system formally based on consensus.
17 See, e.g., Oxfam International (2003), which criticizes the “non-transparent and exclusive meeting”
of trade ministers to discuss agriculture negotiations and other issues.
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significant reforms, even as they accept the importance of trade and
markets. One set of recommendations – what Rodrik (2001)18 calls the
“enlightened standard view” (ESV) – has achieved near-consensus status
in development circles.19
1. Increasing market access in ICs
In the ESV, it is essential to expand access to IC markets by
reducing tariff rates, peaks, and escalation, and NTBs. To the extent
politically feasible, negotiations should focus on sectors where the
development payoff is greatest: (i) labor-intensive manufactures; (ii)
textiles and clothing (including “clean” integration in 2005, tariff
reductions, and no substitution of contingent protection); (iii) temperate
agricultural products (including reductions in domestic support); and (iv)
labor-intensive services.
At the same time, ICs should make market access more
predictable by limiting contingent protection, especially anti-dumping
measures (ADM), and harmonizing and liberalizing rules of origin. They
should continue special efforts to enhance access for LDC exports,
ideally through the “everything but arms” approach introduced by the
EU in 2001. In addition to expanding total LDC exports, this approach
would mitigate distortions created by product restrictions in the GSP
and other preference schemes.
2. Complementary DC policies
The ESV calls for reforms of DC policies and institutions that fall
outside the traditional ambit of trade policy. These reflect the conviction
that trade and market reforms must be shaped and supported by
complementary social and economic policies. The suggested reforms
are intended to help the poor take advantage of economic
opportunities, address their deprivations, and make governance more
responsive. Suggested reforms include:
18 In Rodrik’s formulation, the ESV includes only the first two elements described here. However,
the other elements are so widely accepted they can also be considered part of the ESV.
19 In Rodrik’s view, the ESV replaces the earlier “Washington Consensus,” with its more unconditional
emphasis on privatization and liberalization.
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a. bringing disadvantaged groups into the workforce and
increasing labor mobility;
b. diversifying production and expanding capacities to respond
to market opportunities, through “hard” (internal
transportation, ports) and “soft” (drawback and tax rebate
systems, export financing, marketing) policies;
c. developing rural communities by clarifying property rights,
reforming land tenure, strengthening credit and
infrastructure, and increasing the voice of the rural poor;
d. enhancing social protections, including adjustment periods,
social safety nets, and retraining programs for transitional
losers from liberalization;
e. improving the regulatory climate by introducing sound
macroeconomic policy, removing obstacles to trade like
overvalued exchange rates and export restrictions,
strengthening prudential regulation, enforcing property
rights, and controlling corruption;
f. addressing deprivations like hunger, disease, and poor
education;
g. eliminating social barriers like ethnic and gender
discrimination; and
h. expanding human rights and the rule of law.
A good example of this reform program is the 1999 ADB
Poverty Reduction Strategy (ADB 1999, 6-8). The ADB calls on DCs
to adopt comprehensive poverty reduction strategies designed to
encourage labor-intensive growth and advance social development.
Governments are to promote social development through policies
designed to develop human capital, improve social services, enhance
social protection, eliminate discrimination, build social capital including
enhanced participation by the poor, and control population growth.
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Most domestic reforms must be supported primarily by MDBs
and other IDOs, which can deploy local staffs, country-specific
programs, and financial resources.20 Yet trade policy can also play a
role. Its most important contribution would be to eliminate
impediments to reform. For example, trade negotiators could modify
the AoA to constrain IC support for agriculture and authorize DC
safeguards, facilitating efforts to develop rural areas and provide food
security. They could create flexibility under TRIPS for DC policies
aimed at diversifying production and employing low-skill workers. They
could provide generous transition periods for new commitments,
allowing the poor adequate time to adjust. They could provide DCs
flexibility to respond to shocks, protect transitional losers, and design
innovative social protections. They could ensure that new institutional
requirements do not divert resources from development, and require
major resource commitments only when adequate financial assistance
is available.
Collaboration between trade and IDOs would enhance the ability
of both groups to promote domestic reform. Ex ante, trade institutions
could draw on the normative, programmatic, and country expertise of
IDOs to shape trade rules and institutional requirements, and to
authorize SDT, safeguards, and other DC interventions. Ex post, they
could draw on such knowledge and local staff networks to monitor DC
interventions and transitions. IDOs could gain information about
emerging opportunities and commitments, so they can develop more
focused, timely programs and marshal resources. Collaboration would
help both groups match trade commitments with financial assistance
and TA, through devices such as “implementation audits.”
3. Increasing market access in DCs
Development advocates most often criticize IC trade restrictions,
but DCs also maintain high barriers to exports from other DCs.
Greater access to fast-growing DC markets would contribute
significantly to development. The difficulty lies in enhancing access to
DC markets while facilitating development and social protections in
20 Such reforms are already central to the policies of IDOs. Even for them, however, the scale and
complexity of the reforms proposed in the ESV are daunting.
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those markets. For example, many DCs still rely on tariffs for a large
percentage of government revenues, and lack administrative capacity
to substitute other sources. Again, collaboration between trade
institutions and IDOs could prove fruitful in addressing these problems.
4. Aid for Trade and Reform
The ESV calls for expanded international assistance to help DCs
make the structural and policy changes needed for sustained economic
growth, progress against poverty, and compliance with international
rules. Both financial assistance and TA are required. It is also essential
that donors not offset new commitments against current aid programs.
ESV advocates support three major types of assistance:
(a) “soft aid for trade,” to help DCs participate more fully in the
trading system. Soft aid includes support for policy analysis
and participation in negotiations, dispute resolution, and
other procedures. It includes building capacity to implement
trade rules, related programs like drawback and
international standard setting.21 For many advocates it also
includes support for domestic debates on trade and
development, to encourage considered assessments of
national needs and “ownership” of international
commitments.
(b) “hard aid for trade,” to support product diversification,
moves to higher value-added products and creation of
supply capacity to take advantage of export opportunities,
and to improve trade infrastructure. Export credits can play
a role here, although such programs sometimes focus on
export promotion at the expense of borrowers’
development needs.
21 Development advocates argue that international standards institutions (some of which are given
legal standing in the trade regime through the Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
and, to a lesser extent, Technical Barriers to Trade) tend to reflect the positions of ICs on standards
and on related procedures such as conformity assessment. This has a dual negative impact on DCs,
which lose market opportunities until they can come into compliance with international standards
and must invest greater resources to do so.
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(c) “aid for reform,” to support the domestic policy reforms
essential to development. Here too IDOs must take the
lead, as trade institutions lack the resources for financial
commitments like these. Yet the substance and timing of
IDO assistance could be enhanced through collaboration
with trade institutions. In addition, the WTO is now an
active provider of TA, mainly “soft aid for trade.”
Development advocates urge it to expand such assistance
and extend it to aid for reform, continuing to marshal
resources from member states and other sources in
innovative ways.
5. WTO Governance Reform
Since Seattle, the WTO has made significant strides in enhancing
internal transparency and participation. Proponents of the ESV,
however, urge additional reforms, on much the same pro-poor
rationale that leads them to support domestic governance reform.
B. Critical Views
Some scholars and NGOs recommend deeper changes in the
international trade regime. These critical positions rest on twin
normative foundations.22 The first is a harsh evaluation of the current
system from the perspective of development. Critics charge that the
overall structure of WTO obligations and many specific rules are
fundamentally imbalanced. Put another way, while some observers
argue that only since Doha has the trade regime aimed at redistribution
as well as efficiency (Gerhart 2002), the severest critics argue that the
system has always promoted redistribution: from DCs to ICs! The
second foundation is a desire to reorient the trade regime toward
development and poverty alleviation. The WTO Agreement recognizes
that trade is not an end in itself, but a means to higher living standards
and sustainable development (GATT 1994, 9). To achieve these goals,
critics argue, the regime must be restructured around the goal of
22 It should be noted that the “critical” positions discussed here are quite moderate within the
spectrum of economic ideologies; they do not include Marxist, neo-colonial, dependency, or
similar radical positions.
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equitable human development (Rodrik 2001; Oxfam 2002; Third World
Network 2001).
In such a system, the basic question of trade policy would
become, not whether a national measure is trade-distorting, but
whether it is development-distorting. Most critics have not fully worked
out the application of this abstract principle. In general, though, they
urge that DC governments be allowed to carry out even trade-distorting
interventions that promote development, and should be exempt from
trade-liberalizing rules that hamper development. The arguments of
some critics reflect ideologies deeply skeptical of the market; these will
find little favor in trade institutions or most IDOs. But other arguments
reflect notions of market failure; these should receive a more favorable
hearing.
1. Rectify imbalances
Critics urge a reworking of WTO agreements to rectify
imbalances that hamper development. This is the expressed aim of the
“implementation agenda” in the DDA (WTO 2001b, 3), but critics
support even more extensive rebalancing. Suggested areas include:
a. TRIPS. Even ESV supporters argue that TRIPS creates
significant inequities; critics assess the agreement far more
harshly. Oxfam, for instance, labels TRIPS an
“institutionalized fraud.” A complete response to these
criticisms would require numerous changes. Yet many
critiques could be addressed simply by authorizing countries
at different stages of development to adopt appropriate
levels of intellectual property protection.
b. GATS. Critics emphasize that the services regime has failed
to liberalize labor-intensive services, focusing instead on
sophisticated services where DCs lack capacity. Since
GATS requires specific national commitments, most of this
criticism is properly addressed to ICs. However, the trade
regime could do more, under the rubric of SDT or in other
ways, to help DC governments encourage participation of
local firms in liberalized sectors and to ensure that service
providers are appropriately regulated.
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c. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). Critics
have argued that the SCM Agreement made non-actionable
many types of subsidy primarily used by ICs (e.g., for
research and environmental compliance), but left actionable
types of subsidies that DCs could use to promote higher
value-added production, innovation, and other aspects of
economic development.23
d. Institutional requirements. Some WTO agreements
require domestic institutions that are based on IC models
and hence are too costly and demanding for many DCs.
The trade regime could address this problem by (a) setting
more flexible, outcome-oriented institutional requirements,
(b) specifying different institutions for countries at different
stages of development, or (c) authorizing exceptions for
DCs.
2. Modify Reciprocity
Critics argue that a system based on reciprocal concessions24 is
inappropriate in a world of huge differences in economic and political
capacity and vulnerability. GATT/WTO has long recognized these
differences, creating special exceptions like the “Enabling Clause.”
However, this approach is politically unpalatable in ICs and politically
sensitive in DCs. One alternative is to reframe “reciprocity” to
incorporate diverse levels of development. 25 For example, states could
accept DC concessions as “equivalent” if they reflected current
capacities to an equivalent degree, even if they produced smaller trade
effects. Or states could increase the value of DC concessions by
including an estimate of future trade benefits, to be realized as higher
levels of development are achieved.
23 The category of non-actionable subsidy lapsed according to the terms of the SCM Agreement on
January 1, 2000. Current discussions to restore the exception are discussed below.
24 The criticism covers reciprocity that is explicit, as in market access negotiations, and implicit,
as in the “grand bargain” of the Uruguay Round.
25 Many different formulations of the general notion of "reciprocity" are already part of the trade
and broader political vocabulary (Abbott 1996b; Keohane 1986).
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3. Special and differential treatment
While the ESV focuses on increasing DC access to foreign
markets, critics put equal weight on allowing DC governments to
intervene in their own markets to promote development. They see this
as reversing the current situation, in which ICs, MDBs, and the WTO
have all urged DCs to liberalize in spite of uncertain export prospects
and vulnerability.26 Critics urge greater latitude for infant industry
protection and similar interventions under GATT 1994 and agreements
such as TRIPS, Trade-Related Investment Measures, and SCM.27
Critics also support other aspects of SDT. For example, the trade
regime should exempt DCs from inappropriately stringent and costly
rules and institutional requirements, and should create transition periods
adequate for adjustment by poor workers and weak economies. SDT
should not be viewed as a favor or special dispensation, but as a logical
response to asymmetries in a system committed to development
(Malhotra 2002; Monterrey Declaration 2002).
Some critics support their positions empirically, arguing (a) that
economic data do not show a persuasive correlation between import
liberalization and subsequent growth, and (b) that targeted interventions
have been associated with rapid growth in DCs like the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and Viet Nam and earlier in some ICs. (To
other observers, of course, the data suggest very different conclusions.)
Other critics support their positions theoretically, arguing that
development in vastly different societies and economic conditions
requires diverse government structures, economic policies, social
protections, and the like. Just as there are many “varieties of
capitalism” (e.g., Japan, Sweden, and US), so there can be many
varieties of development policy. The most persuasive critics do not
prescribe specific arrangements, but argue that DCs should be granted
freedom to experiment (Rodrik 2001).
26 The harshest critics see the ESV itself as an IC strategem, offering to grant some additional market
access in exchange for DC agreement on further liberalization and new issues, limiting even more
their ability to intervene to promote development.
27 GATT 1994 already allows many such interventions under Article XVIII and Part IV.  It would
be valuable to engage critics in a discussion of the viability of existing exceptions and procedures.
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Mechanisms to control moral hazard are essential features in any
system of SDT, certainly an expanded one. Capture, corruption, and
other forms of government failure will persist and must be addressed.
Yet critics have not persuasively demonstrated how this could be done.
Rodrik proposes limiting SDT to “democratic” states, so that national
measures are presumptively popularly supported. But this criterion
seems unworkable in practice, and would penalize poor residents of
non-democratic states. Alternatively, trade institutions could utilize
information derived from collaboration with IDOs, development NGOs,
and other groups with expertise, local knowledge, and on-site staffs to
better authorize SDT, monitor its use, and withdraw authority in case
of abuse.
4. Address trade issues of concern to DCs and LDCs
The WTO has taken on many issues of special interest to ICs
(e.g., IPRs, services). But it has left some issues of special concern to
DCs in the hands of weaker regimes. Most important is the problem
of basic commodities. Many LDCs continue to depend on the export
of a few commodities. Yet commodity prices have been in decline for
years, and commodity markets are highly volatile, leading to shocks
and uncertainty that hamper investment. The WTO has left this
problem to institutions like UNCTAD, which lack its legal force and the
financial resources of the MDBs.
UNCTAD recognizes that previous responses – commodity
agreements designed to stabilize market prices – have failed. It calls
for new approaches, supported if necessary by new institutions
(UNCTAD 2002; Third World Network 2001). Some of the actions it
suggests are domestic and country-specific, and so should be supported
primarily by MDBs.28 Other actions require international responses.
These include moving commodity markets toward long-term contracts,
promoting fair trade principles, and establishing compensatory
financing facilities. The WTO could advance some of these solutions,
e.g., promoting fair trade principles. IDOs will have to take the lead
on others. Even here, though, trade institutions could provide valuable
28 These include helping LDCs move into more dynamic, value-added sectors like processed food,
and helping exporters enter buyer supply chains and meet international standards.
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support: expanding market access, authorizing DC interventions to
promote transitions, easing liberalization during transition periods, and
providing TA.
5. Address food security and rural development
The 1996 World Food Summit defined “food security” as a
situation in which all people at all times have physical and economic
access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs
and preferences for an active and healthy life. At present, however,
the FAO indicates that some 800 million people in DCs, mainly in Asia
and Africa, suffer from chronic food insecurity.29 WHO (2002) lists
malnutrition and its effects as among the leading causes of disease and
premature death, especially in DCs. In spite of international
commitments, hunger remains one of the most pervasive deprivations
associated with poverty. Critics urge IDOs and the WTO to respond
aggressively.
Food aid is important in avoiding starvation, but a long-term
solution must combine adequate earnings by the poor and availability
of food through imports and domestic production. Many DCs have
limited foreign exchange and high debt levels, so ensuring adequate
domestic output is essential. In addition, food-insecure DCs are largely
rural, making productive agriculture crucial to development as well as
food security.
The AoA focuses on agricultural problems faced by ICs: high
levels of support, leading to over-production and export subsidies. But
DCs face very different issues: inadequate support, low productivity,
and insufficient resources. DC food insecurity thus requires different
rules, including authority for careful government intervention (also
justifiable as a response to IC distortions). Under either rationale,
permitted subsidies, infrastructure programs, and TA should be targeted
at small, poor farmers; such measures would have little impact on
world markets. Similarly, negotiators should not ask DCs to further
reduce protection and support for agriculture until they have achieved
29 Others are considered vulnerable to hunger.  In addition, some 34 million food-insecure people
reside in ICs (FAO 2001).
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greater food security – and until ICs have lowered their own trade
barriers and support programs. At Doha, DCs sought a “development
box” in the AoA to accomplish these ends (Priyadarshi 2002). Although
this particular solution has not been pressed during the negotiations,
the demand for rules allowing DCs to address food insecurity has
continued.
6. Address development issues in coordinated fashion
To promote development and poverty reduction, the international
community must adopt comprehensive, coordinated policies. At
present, however, various facets of development are relegated to
different regimes, and some fall through the cracks. Critics urge that
some institution be given a mandate and sufficient resources to respond
to each of the major deprivations and problems of development. The
choice of an institution can be controversial.30 However specific issues
are assigned, though, critics urge that the organizations actively
coordinate their programs for maximum effectiveness (Monterrey
Declaration 2002).
V.  THE DOHA ROUND AND THE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
The Declaration gave development great rhetorical prominence.
Substantively too, it authorized negotiators to consider many of the
changes called for by proponents of the ESV, and some of those urged
by critics. Yet three general points tempered this optimistic assessment
even at the outset of the Round.
 First, the Declaration addressed many issues in carefully
ambiguous language. These provisions can be read as more
or less supportive of the development agenda. On
development, as in many other areas, “the Doha
Declaration’s meaning depends on the reader” (ICTSD
2001).
30 The debate over WTO action on issues like labor rights and environmental protection has been
intense. Critics generally prefer to keep such issues out of the WTO, because trade negotiations
are likely to require DCs to adopt costly rules based on IC models. At the Singapore ministerial,
trade ministers decided to leave labor rights as the primary domain of the International Labour
Organization, and the Declaration reaffirmed this decision.
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 Second, for all its development rhetoric, the Declaration still
placed trade liberalization at the heart of the negotiations
(e.g., paras. 1-2). The emphasis on liberalization necessarily
foreclosed some policy options.
 Third, the Declaration was merely an agreement among
trade ministers to initiate a work program. It identified
subjects for negotiation in the Round and stated goals,
principles, and procedures for those negotiations; it did not
determine concrete outcomes. These can take shape only
during actual negotiations.
The initial 18 months of negotiation have been disappointing,
with little progress in translating the DDA into concrete agreements.
Most significant for the overall success of the Round is the continuing
deadlock on agriculture. As this is written, member states remain far
apart on a wide range of agriculture issues, including many important
to DCs. This stalemate has led members to defer serious bargaining
in other areas, including services and market access for manufactures
(ICTSD 2003a, 1).
Other early setbacks suggest more pointedly that IC members
are reluctant to give effect to the pro-development provisions of the
Declaration. The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), tasked
with clarifying SDT provisions in WTO agreements, is deeply split, and
the General Council has been unable to provide guidance. Similarly,
the Director-General has been unable to bridge intense disagreements
over implementation issues. High profile discussions to extend the
TRIPS Declaration have also broken down.
The first section in this part discusses some significant elements
in the structure of negotiations in the Round. The next two sections
review the provisions of the Declaration and the results of the early
negotiations on development issues. The first of these discusses issues
emphasized in the ESV, the second those highlighted in critical
positions. The final section in this part assesses the potential
contributions of the Round.
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A. The Single Undertaking
The Declaration provided (para. 47) that the conduct and
conclusion of negotiations in the Round and the entry into force of its
results are to be treated as a “single undertaking,” much as in the
Uruguay Round. The main elements of the single undertaking
negotiations are agriculture, market access for manufactures, services,
WTO rules (including ADM and SCM), trade and environment, the
implementation agenda (or most of it), and probably some aspects of
SDT.31 Under the single undertaking principle, concessions in one
subject area can be treated as consideration for those in another,
expanding the zone of potential agreement. On the other hand,
deadlock in one controversial area, such as agriculture, could block
completion of the entire Round.
Several subjects are clearly not part of the single undertaking
negotiations, at least at this time. At Doha, largely because of DC
reluctance,32 ministers agreed to begin negotiations on the “Singapore
issues” – trade and competition, trade and investment, transparency
in government procurement, and trade facilitation – only after the
Cancun Ministerial, and then only on the basis of a decision on
modalities to be taken there. They authorized the TRIPS Council to
consider the application of TRIPS to biological diversity and public
health. They created “work programs” or “working groups” distinct
from the negotiations in areas including trade, debt, and finance;
transfer of technology (TOT); electronic commerce; and small
economies. On TA and the problems of LDCs, the Doha procedures
are even softer.
31 As discussed below, the extent to which implementation and SDT form part of the single undertaking
negotiations is hotly contested.
32 DCs are reluctant to consider these issues for several reasons. First, they view them as more
relevant to IC interests than to their own. Second, they view them as significantly increasing the
complexity of the Round, and thus its demand on their capacity. Third, especially with investment
and transparency in procurement, they view them as indirect ways to impose new market access
commitments, which DCs are reluctant to make after the Uruguay Round – at least until their
outstanding concerns with implementation and SDT are satisfactorily addressed. Fourth, they view
these issues as likely to result in costly new domestic administrative requirements. Finally, they
view all four issues as addressing behind the border measures, setting new precedents for the further
expansion of the trade regime into domestic policy areas.
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It is obvious from this summary that many issues of special
concern to DCs are relegated to weak procedures unlikely to produce
firm commitments. For example, while the section on the special
problems of LDCs was among the longest in the Declaration (paras.
42-43), it authorized few concrete actions.33 On trade, debt, and finance,
and TOT, Working Groups were merely charged with an “examination”
of the issues and “any possible recommendations” (and have made little
progress even so).
The implementation issues identified in the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns (Implementation
Decision) are treated as an integral part of the Doha work program
(WTO 2001c). But this also renders them part of the single undertaking
negotiations.34 As a result, it appears that ICs can demand new DC
concessions in return for acting on these issues, even though the
purpose of the implementation agenda is to rectify perceived imbalances
in WTO agreements. The Declaration is less clear on the status of SDT
issues, but it appears that many of them, at least, will be treated the
same way.
B. Issues under the ESV
1. Access to IC markets
The Declaration set a relatively strong market access agenda,
consistent with its focus on trade liberalization. Para. 2 emphasized the
role that trade can play in development and poverty alleviation, placed
the needs of DCs at the heart of the DDA, and pledged “positive efforts”
to ensure that DCs and especially LDCs share equitably in world trade.35
Para. 42 reinforced this pledge by adopting the “objective” of duty- and
quota-free access for LDC exports. It welcomed the commitments
made at the Third UN Conference on LDCs, and undertook to
34 Whether the implementation issues included in a companion document to the Implementation
Decision are likewise part of the negotiations remains under dispute.
35 Similarly, para. 3 notes the vulnerability and structural difficulties of LDCs and commits to
improve their participation in trade and the global economy.
33 Ministers instructed the Secretariat to reflect their concern with LDCs in its annual TA plans, and
instructed the Sub-Committee on LDCs to design a work program on the special problems of
these countries. For the rest, ministers “acknowledged,” “recognized,” set “objectives,” “welcomed,”
agreed to “consider,” “endorsed,” and the like.
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“consider” additional measures for “progressive improvements” in
access. This section exemplifies both the development focus of the
Declaration and its studied ambiguity.
The Declaration and early stages of the Round have addressed
market access in particular sectors with widely varying levels of
specificity and commitment.
(a) On manufactures, para. 16 of the Declaration approved
negotiations to reduce or eliminate tariffs – including tariff
peaks and escalation – and NTBs, especially on products
of interest to DCs.36 While this provision applies in
principle to all products, it does not specifically mention
labor-intensive manufactures. The Declaration also failed to
call for the full and timely integration of textiles and clothing
into the trade regime, much less the accelerated removal
of quotas some DCs had sought.
As this is written, market access negotiations remain
preliminary, focused on reconciling proposed negotiation
modalities (e.g., linear tariff cuts, various tariff-cutting
formulas).37 Yet proposals from influential members
suggest that, if negotiations succeed, the Round could
significantly enhance access to IC markets. The EU
proposes compressing tariff rates into a narrow range,
greatly reducing peaks. It also proposes reducing tariff
escalation on DC products, cutting tariffs on textiles and
footwear near zero, and rapidly extending everything but
arms treatment to all LDC exports. The US proposes to
eliminate manufactures tariffs in two stages by 2015 and
reduce NTBs. The Republic of Korea38 and New Zealand
also propose NTB reductions. DCs in Asia should support
all these proposals.
36 It also provided that negotiations are to take account of the special needs and interests of DCs.
37 The Declaration set an end of May 2003 deadline for agreeing on modalities. However, this
deadline has been missed due to the general slowdown caused by the agriculture stalemate.
38 Henceforth Korea.
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Two development issues currently loom large. The first is
whether DCs will be expected to make the same
liberalization commitments as ICs, or whether they will be
allowed to maintain greater protection in certain sectors
through SDT or alternate modalities (ICTSD/IISD 2003d;
ICTSD 2003f). As discussed further below, Bangladesh,
PRC, India, and others have expressed concern that
ambitious tariff-cutting would threaten vulnerable sectors in
many DCs.39 The second issue, raised by Bangladesh and
other LDCs, is whether tariff cuts will further erode the
value of trade preferences. These members propose to
defer IC tariff cuts where LDC exporters rely on
preferences. This proposal may prove divisive for DCs in
Asia, as deferral would come at the expense of more
advanced DC exporters.
(b) On agriculture, the Declaration (para. 13) reiterated the
long-term goal of restricting agriculture market distortions.
“[W]ithout prejudging the outcome of the negotiations”
already underway pursuant to the AoA, it approved
comprehensive negotiations aimed at improving market
access and substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic
support.40
As noted earlier, negotiators failed to meet a March
deadline for agreeing on modalities, casting the success of
the negotiations into doubt. Modalities suggested by the
Chair on his own responsibility (WTO 2003b) were rejected
39 DCs have also expressed concern with the EU’s emphasis on reducing the gap between bound and
applied tariffs, a gap characteristic of many DC tariff structures after the Uruguay Round.
40 The explicit reference to “trade-distorting” domestic support would seem to limit negotiations to
measures included in the so-called “amber box” of the AoA, which includes most domestic
measures regarded as distorting production and trade, e.g., through price supports or production
limits. However, some agricultural exporting countries argue that this provision can be read to
authorize discussion of all forms of domestic support, including measures falling within the AoA
“green box” and “blue box.” This position is taken by the Cairns Group (which includes Australia,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, and Thailand, among others) and the Like-Minded
States (including Pakistan and Sri Lanka).
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by both sides: by agricultural exporting countries, including
the Cairns Group and the Like-Minded States (both of
which include DCs from Asia and other regions) and the
US, for proposing inadequate liberalization; and by the EU
and other advocates of multifunctionality (including Korea
and Japan) for giving insufficient recognition to non-trade
concerns like food safety and the environment (ICTSD/IISD
2003a; ICTSD 2003b).
Discussions on market access have focused on tariff cuts,
reductions in domestic support, and the special safeguard
mechanism (SSG) in the AoA. On all three issues, DCs are
split, with large exporters opposing those that seek
flexibility to intervene in pursuit of food security, rural
development, and similar goals.
(i) On tariffs, the exporters support formula cuts that
would disproportionately reduce high tariffs; others,
including the EU, India, Japan, and Korea, favor
linear cuts that would preserve some peaks, perhaps
with a minimum percentage reduction. The Chair
proposed a series of tariff reduction “bands,” with ICs
required to make larger cuts in each band. This
appears to be a sensible approach for DCs in Asia.
Here too, the erosion of preference margins has
emerged as a significant and divisive issue. The
Chair’s proposal would defer IC tariff cuts on products
subject to long-standing preferences or of vital export
interest to DCs, while calling for assistance to help
DCs diversify production.
(ii) On domestic support, the differences are even wider.
Supporters of liberalization, including the PRC and
India as well as the exporter groupings, advocate (a)
the rapid phase-out of “amber box” subsidies (which
are understood to distort production and trade by
supporting prices or limiting production, and were
hence to be reduced under the AoA); (b) the
imposition of additional restrictions on “green box”
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measures (only minimally distorting because they are
not tied to prices or production, as with support for
research or structural adjustment, and hence not
restricted under the AoA); and (c) the reduction of
“blue box” measures (partially linked to production
restrictions, but subject to a special AoA exemption).
Supporters of multifunctionality, in contrast, propose
(a) only to reduce amber box measures; (b) to expand
permissible green box subsidies for non-trade
purposes; and (c) to preserve the blue box as a
transitional measure (ICTSD 2003b, 3).
Most DCs in Asia should support tighter restrictions
on domestic support: they can ill afford to adopt these
measures themselves, and reducing IC support will
enhance market access. One exception might be the
maintenance or expansion of certain green box
measures, especially those that serve to enhance
agricultural productivity (Orden, et al. 2002).
(iii) Agricultural exporters seek to eliminate, at least for
ICs, the SSG created by the AoA (GATT 1994, 46-
8). Like other safeguards (e.g., GATT 1994, 273-81),
the SSG allows importing countries to impose
additional tariffs on certain products for limited
periods, to protect domestic producers from sudden
increases in imports or declines in prices resulting
from trade liberalization. ICs resist this proposal,
fearing it would expose them to damaging import
surges. Many DCs also support creating a new SSG
more useful to them: few qualify for the current
provision.41 An SSG could be a valuable tool for DCs
in Asia, provided it were focused on protecting poor
farmers in unusual circumstances and narrow enough
to avoid protectionist abuse.
41 The existing SSG only applies to designated products for which quantitative import restraints
were converted into tariffs during the Uruguay Round; relatively few DCs made such conversions,
as few of them previously maintained quantitative restraints on agricultural products.
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(c) On services, para. 15 of the Declaration included a general
undertaking to negotiate with a view to promoting
economic growth in all countries and development in DCs
and LDCs. Services negotiations mandated by GATS were
already underway, and in March 2001 the Services Council
adopted Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations,
later incorporated in the Declaration. The Guidelines specify
the request-offer method as the modality for negotiating
specific commitments on market access (WTO 2001a).
As this is written, most ICs and a few DCs have submitted
requests for commitments; members are preparing offers
in response. DCs have been relatively inactive, with most
not submitting any requests (ICTSD/IISD 2003c).42 The
request-offer modality is resource-intensive, and DCs fear
that it puts them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis powerful trading
partners. However, it seems unlikely that this modality can
be changed at this point, and it will be difficult for DCs in
Asia to participate more actively without significant
assistance. DCs that have submitted requests, such as India,
emphasize expanding the movement of natural persons
and related changes like easing residency requirements
(ICTSD 2003g). DCs in Asia should support such
proposals, although major progress seems unlikely in the
post-9/11 era. Some LDCs argue that ICs should afford
them full market access in sectors of interest, under the
special treatment clauses in GATS. ICs respond, however,
that they can only consider special treatment in the context
of individual requests.
(d) The Declaration all but ensured that the Round would do
little to increase trade security by constraining contingent
protection. Para. 28 approved negotiations aimed at
“clarifying and improving disciplines” under the SCM and
ADM Agreements, taking into account the needs of DCs.
Many DCs had demanded that the Round address these
42 The deadlines set for these steps are not being carefully observed, due in part to the general
slowdown in all areas of the Round.
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issues because of the increasing application of contingent
protection against them.43 However, at the instance of the
US and other ICs, the Declaration also provided that
negotiations should preserve “the basic concepts, principles,
and effectiveness” of the Agreements, their instruments and
objectives, greatly limiting the scope for negotiation.
The political division suggested by these provisions has
been manifested in early negotiations (ICTSD/IISD 2003g;
ICTSD 2003e, 9). The most contentious area is ADM. The
Friends of Anti-Dumping Negotiations (which includes
Hong Kong, China; Japan; Korea; Singapore;
Taipei,China; and Thailand, and is supported by many
other states) propose constraining ADM, limiting
burdensome investigations, and increasing transparency
and procedural safeguards through amendments to the
Agreement. The EU has been supportive, calling for a
special dispute procedure to review the initiation of ADM
proceedings even before they reach substantive conclusions.
DCs in Asia should support these proposals.
The US, on the other hand, seeks to maintain current
flexibility to apply ADM and to protect national
determinations from legal attack in the WTO. (Some DC
users of ADMs, led by Egypt, support this approach.) The
US also seeks to regulate techniques for circumventing
ADM (and countervailing duties), such as minor product
modifications. Finally, the US proposes to enhance
procedural safeguards in ADM proceedings. Procedural
safeguards are thus a potential area of agreement, although
many DCs find the specific procedures the US favors to be
unduly complex and costly.
Similar divisions affect negotiations on SCM. For example,
India proposes amending the SCM Agreement to expand
43 DCs also included numerous proposed changes to ADMs and countervailing duties in the compilation
of outstanding implementation issues.
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SDT. It would exempt certain DC export subsidies and limit
the size of countervailing duties. The US opposes all
proposals to restrict countervailing duties, and seeks to
tighten restrictions on certain subsidies. Some DCs and ICs
propose reinstating the lapsed category of “non-actionable
subsidy.” However, DCs generally favor a more expansive
category, including some subsidies aimed at development,44
e.g., for diversification of production, as well as those
previously treated as non-actionable (e.g., for research and
development and environmental compliance).
2. Access to DC markets
 The Declaration generally viewed DCs as the beneficiaries of
market access. In terms of market access commitments, it implicitly
aimed at ICs, although many provisions were general enough to cover
DC markets. Yet the Declaration also contained a number of provisions
on SDT, including the principle that DCs need not make fully reciprocal
market access commitments (e.g., para. 16). Thus the Declaration left
unresolved the inherent tension between increasing access to DC
markets and SDT. As discussed below, this tension has been manifested
in the early negotiations.
3. Complementary DC policies
The Declaration was virtually silent on the type of domestic
reforms called for by the ESV. Some negotiations could indirectly
facilitate reform: for example, greater market access for agricultural
products could help DCs promote rural development. Other provisions
touched on relevant issues, such as services regulation (para. 7), trade
facilitation (para. 27), and supply constraints in LDCs (paras. 42-43).
In general, though, the Declaration made little attempt to mobilize trade
policy in support of domestic reform, and the early negotiations have
followed the same path.
44 Article 10.2 of WTO (2001c) “takes note” of such proposals and urges restraint in challenging
development subsidies during the Round.
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4. Aid for trade and reform
Among the most pro-development aspects of the Declaration –
and of recent WTO policy – is support of “soft aid for trade.” The
Declaration described TA and capacity building as “core elements of
the development dimension of the multilateral trading system” (paras.
38-41).45 It endorsed the WTO’s New Strategy for Technical
Cooperation and instructed the Secretariat to help DCs “mainstream”
trade in development plans, with a focus on implementing and adjusting
to WTO obligations and exercising the benefits of membership.46 Other
provisions supported TA for LDCs (para. 43) and in specific
negotiations, especially the Singapore issues.47 These undertakings
helped persuade DCs to agree to the Doha Round; DCs in Asia should
insist that they be carried out as a condition for agreeing to negotiations
on the Singapore issues.
The Declaration also supported cooperation with development
agencies to enhance TA. It noted the “urgent necessity” of coordinating
WTO programs with bilateral donors, the MDBs and the DAC within
a coherent policy framework. It called on the Director-General to
consult with these actors and with beneficiaries to strengthen the
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs
(IF) (para. 39), and called on members and “development partners” to
increase their financial support (e.g., paras. 40, 43). It urged the IF
agencies to consider expanding membership in the program, and to
strengthen its ability to address supply constraints in LDCs.
Yet the Declaration did not address all the forms of assistance
recommended by development advocates. It devoted little attention to
supporting DC participation in WTO activities outside the Round, such
as dispute settlement, or trade-related activities outside the WTO, such
as standard setting, both significant for DCs in Asia.48 It downplayed
assistance for domestic reforms, including those needed to take
advantage of trade opportunities. It was largely silent on financial
45 Additional TA provisions are included in WTO (2001c), especially paras. 2-3, 5, and 14.
46 The Declaration endorses and undertakes to strengthen the work of the International Trade Centre.
47 Declaration paras. 16 [market access], 20-21 [investment], 23-24 [competition], and 33 [environment].
48 However, the WTO and World Bank have recently initiated a joint assistance program addressing
the development of standards (WTO 2002b).
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assistance, and neither provided for nor endorsed “hard aid for trade,”
even incidentally.49
TA has not figured explicitly in the early negotiations, but the
Secretariat continues to operate and develop programs (ICTSD/IISD
2003j). In December 2002, the Director-General reported on
implementation of the TA commitments in the Declaration. The report
describes the many activities in the current Technical Assistance Plan
– e.g., trade policy courses, topical workshops on request, workshops
to train trainers, and advanced Doha Round training courses – as well
as voluntary contributions to the Doha Development Round Global
Trust Fund, the TA database created with OECD, and inter-agency
efforts like the IF and the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance
Program for Africa.
5. WTO governance reform
“Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO
membership,” the Declaration confirmed the need to ensure internal
transparency (e.g., through information dissemination) and effective
participation of all members (para. 10). Members undertook to conduct
the Doha negotiations in the same fashion (para. 49). Apart from its
commitments on TA, the Declaration did not spell out any specific
reforms in these areas. However, members did agree (para. 30) to
“negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding,” with a deadline of May 2003.
Negotiators failed to meet this deadline. Members have submitted
many proposals, but they have so far been unable even to identify areas
where consensus might be possible (ICTSD 2003c, 6). Several
proposals aim to improve the position of DCs in dispute settlement.
These include expanding SDT, strengthening the obligation to take the
circumstances of DCs into account, speeding up authorization of
retaliation, and expanding the remedies available to weaker states to
promote compliance with rulings.
49 However, the WTO Secretariat’s 2003 TA plan notes that the WTO will urge other funding agencies
to support trade-related infrastructure projects.
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C. Issues Identified by Critics
1. Orientation to development
Critics urge a reorientation of the trading system toward the goals
of development and poverty alleviation. The Declaration recognized the
importance of these goals (para. 2). Implicitly, at least, it acknowledged
that DCs, especially LDCs, have not been fully integrated into the
trading system (paras. 2, 35, 42). It included numerous specific
undertakings in favor of DCs.
Yet the Declaration did not work any fundamental reorientation.
It kept liberalization of trade as the central mandate of the Round,
emphasizing the contributions trade can make to development (paras.
1-2). It did not acknowledge any fundamental imbalance in WTO
obligations, and made no move to accept as an organizing principle
the elimination of policies that distort development. It also focused
explicitly on economic development, resisting efforts to define the
central problem as human development. As a result, it neglected
important aspects of development policy, including domestic reform
and the deprivations associated with poverty.50
The early negotiations have reinforced these interpretations.
Members have advanced numerous proposals that favor DCs. Yet
many problematic areas of WTO law remain unaffected. In addition,
negotiators have deadlocked on central development issues like
agriculture, SDT, implementation, and TRIPS and public health. These
disputes have impeded progress in other important areas like market
access for manufactures, throwing the success of the Round into doubt.
Cancun may restore some momentum, but the setbacks to date suggest
that these differences will be very difficult to bridge.
2. Rectifying imbalances
The Declaration observed generally that “balanced rules” can
help DCs achieve a share of world trade commensurate with their needs
50 The Declaration does reaffirm a commitment to sustainable development (para. 10), while approving
only limited negotiations on trade and environment (paras. 31-32).
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(para. 2). More concretely, it incorporated into the Doha work program
the Implementation Decision – which calls for action on some 90
imbalances in WTO agreements51 – with specific modalities for
negotiation (para. 12).
While this action provided avenues for addressing imbalances,
however, it was in some ways disappointing to DCs. By situating
implementation issues within the single undertaking negotiations, the
Declaration in effect requires new concessions as the price of
rebalancing. DCs argue they should not have to “pay twice” for action
on these issues. At the same time, the Declaration left it ambiguous
whether certain issues are to be addressed in the negotiations or
through deliberations in regular WTO bodies. With both the mandate
and substantive issues contested, members have made little progress.
Even with the incorporation of the Implementation Decision,
moreover, the Declaration and early negotiations have failed to address
some major imbalances identified by critics.
(a) On intellectual property, the most important action at
Doha was the TRIPS Declaration (WTO 2001d), which
greatly reduced uncertainty as to the ability of DCs to
facilitate access to essential patented medicines52 through
parallel importing and compulsory licensing (para. 17 of
WTO 2001b). However, it left unresolved how DCs lacking
local capacity to manufacture drugs can utilize compulsory
licensing. Because TRIPS Article 31(f) requires that
production under compulsory license be predominantly for
local markets, such DCs can neither license producers in
other states or import in quantity from states that have
licensed local firms. The TRIPS Declaration instructed the
TRIPS Council to find an “expeditious” solution to this issue
and report by the end of 2002.53
51 Although the Implementation Decision resolved a few issues, it left most to continuing negotiation.
Many implementation issues were also relegated to a companion document, the Compilation of
Implementation Issues Raised by Members, Job(01)/152/Rev.1, incorporated by reference in the
Declaration; these were clearly not resolved by the Implementation Decision (ICTSD/IISD 2003a).
52 The TRIPS Declaration also extended by 10 years, to 2016, the deadline for LDCs to adopt patent
protection for pharmaceuticals.
53 As they are understood to concern an implementation issue, these deliberations are outside the
single undertaking negotiations of the Round.
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The Council failed to meet that deadline, and it remains
deadlocked (ICTSD/IISD 2003e). In December 2002, the
Chair put forward a draft interim decision that only the US
opposed. It would have established a moratorium on legal
challenges to compulsory licenses and related actions within
its scope until an amendment to TRIPS was adopted. The
moratorium would have applied to all LDCs, and to other
members (except advanced ICs), after notification, for
actions during national emergencies or cases of extreme
urgency.54 Yet even this modest proposal could not attract
a consensus.
The major sticking point is the scope of the health threats
to which a solution would apply. The Chair’s draft would
protect action against any public health threat that afflicts
many DCs and LDCs, especially HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria, and other epidemics.55 Most DCs support this
formulation. However, Switzerland and US feared that this
phrase could be interpreted (and was intended) to authorize
compulsory licensing so extensive as to weaken patent
protection for pharmaceuticals. These members initially
favored limiting action only to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria, but later agreed to specify a number of infectious
diseases plus “other epidemics of comparable gravity and
scale.”
It is difficult to believe that negotiators of good will could not
bridge the remaining difference in positions, given the scale
of suffering involved. Yet the TRIPS Council rejected
several compromises and has deferred further action.56 It
is strongly in the interest of DCs in Asia to resolve this
issue. Both the Chair’s draft and the current US-Swiss
position cover HIV/AIDS and major infectious diseases, so
the precise formulation is less important than rapid
resolution.
54 The draft also included a provision encouraging members to engage in TOT and capacity building
in DCs pursuant to the TRIPS Declaration.
55 This formulation follows the language of the TRIPS Declaration.
56 In the meanwhile, the EU, US, and other developed members have adopted unilateral moratoriums
of varying scope, consistent with their negotiating positions.
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The Doha Declaration initiated two other deliberations on
IPRs. First, it created a Working Group under the General
Council to consider the relationship between trade and
technology and mechanisms within the WTO mandate to
increase TOT (para. 37).57 Any recommendations are to be
submitted to the Cancun Ministerial. Second, the
Declaration instructed the TRIPS Council to examine the
relationship between TRIPS and the Convention on
Biological Diversity, traditional knowledge, and similar issues
(para. 19). Neither process is part of the single undertaking
negotiations. In other respects, the Declaration left the IPR
regime almost wholly unchanged.
One would expect the TOT Working Group to play a
significant role in a “development round.” But as in other
areas of the DDA, the positions of DCs and ICs are far
apart, and the Group has managed little progress (ICTSD/
IISD 2003i). The US and some other ICs insist that the
Group limit itself to general deliberations on ways to
encourage innovation and TOT consistent with TRIPS,58
without trying to produce specific recommendations. DCs,
in contrast, urge it to recommend specific, practical ways to
implement TOT clauses in WTO agreements, and to
consider related issues like restrictive business practices.
The biodiversity and traditional knowledge discussions also
remain at an early stage, with IC and DC positions far apart
(ICTSD/IISD 2003e, 4). A group of DCs – including PRC,
India, Pakistan, and Thailand – proposes an amendment
to TRIPS that would require firms seeking to patent
products derived from living materials or traditional
knowledge to demonstrate informed consent by the source
57 The TRIPS Council also considered monitoring and implementation of national incentives for
TOT to LDCs, pursuant to TRIPS Art. 66.2 and Implementation Decision para. 11.2. In February
2003, the Council adopted a procedure for annual reports by ICs, to be reviewed by the Council,
on actions taken or planned under Art. 66.2 (ICTSD 2003d, 8).
58 Even ICs open to broader deliberations, like the EU, propose a relatively narrow agenda, focusing
on assessments of the effectiveness of different TOT channels, at least at the outset.
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country and some sharing of benefits with it. ICs, especially
the US, oppose any amendment of TRIPS, especially one
that could be seen as imposing a new requirement for
patentability. DCs in Asia should support both Groups.
Lacking some new catalyst, though, it seems unlikely that
either will produce any breakthrough.
(b) On services, the Declaration affirmed the right of
governments to regulate and introduce new regulations on
the supply of services (para. 7). But it did not address
restrictions on labor-intensive services or the imbalance in
access that results from such restrictions.59 Early
negotiations have not led to any rebalancing, and may have
introduced even greater imbalances.60
GATS Art. IV.1 requires members to facilitate DC
participation in services trade through negotiated
commitments to strengthen DC industries, improve access
to supply channels, and increase market access.61 The
Guidelines instruct the Services Council to review
implementation of these commitments, but little has been
accomplished (ICTSD/IISD 2003c, 3). DCs in Asia should
press for greater attention to these issues, although major
results seem unlikely.
To date ICs have tabled far more requests for specific
commitments than have DCs. IC requests also include the
removal of “horizontal” regulations on entry of
59 As noted earlier, the Declaration set target dates for requests and offers for specific commitments
on services.  Many DCs opposed such targets, but acceded in return for similar deadlines on
agriculture. Some requests and offers have been submitted, though few met the deadlines.
60 GATS and the negotiation Guidelines call for an assessment of the state of services liberalization,
with negotiations to be adjusted accordingly.   However, the request-offer process is well underway
and no assessment has been conducted.
61 The Council for Trade in Services was empowered to consider how members could be granted
credit for autonomous liberalization measures in service sectors. In March 2003, the Council agreed
that credit should be granted as part of bilateral negotiations, and should take whatever form
bilateral pairs approve. DCs had sought a decision that they would not be expected to grant full
credit for IC liberalization measures, but the final resolution provided only that in bilateral
discussions members must take into account the flexibility provided for DCs at different stages
of development (ICTSD 2003g).
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professionals and foreign investment, as well as “additional
commitments” that would create barriers to regulation.62
Responding to these requests poses difficult issues for DCs
in Asia. The issues are complex, technical, and
substantively difficult: while services liberalization would
produce economic and social benefits, DCs must preserve
appropriate regulatory authority. Trade-related TA could
make a major contribution in this area. LDCs seek special
treatment in the request-offer process under GATS Art.
XIX.3, but this demand has generally been rebuffed.
Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
and other DCs propose an emergency safeguard
mechanism, but WTO members are deeply split on its
desirability (ICTSD 2003g).
(c) On subsidies, the Declaration spoke of taking into account
the needs of DCs, but it did not address the imbalances
perceived by critics. Indeed it explicitly preserved existing
concepts and principles. The Implementation Decision and
its companion compilation of issues identified several SCM
issues, but only one has been successfully addressed.63 As
noted earlier, negotiators have considered restoring the
category of non-actionable subsidies to the SCM
Agreement and extending it to include some development
measures. However, the US is simultaneously pressing for
tighter restrictions on subsidies, and negotiators have made
few concrete decisions.
(d) On the problem of inappropriate domestic institutional
requirements, the Declaration said little; early negotiations
have largely avoided the problem. Significantly, the DDA
contemplated no change in the institutional requirements of
TRIPS, and none has been debated. In describing potential
negotiations on the Singapore issues, the Declaration
62 DCs initially resisted general discussion of domestic regulation under GATS Article VI.4, but
some, including several Asian DCs, have come to support this in an effort to moderate bilateral
demands.
63 Members authorized a number of extensions to the transition period provided in the SCM Agreement
for LDCs and poorer DCs (ICTSD/IISD 2003a).
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acknowledged the special needs of DCs and called for TA,
but did not address the problem of costly institutional
requirements. The issue has at least been raised in early
discussions. For example, the EU acknowledged in
discussions on competition that the costs of implementing
transparency may pose a burden for DCs (ICTSD/IISD
2003f, 3). DCs in Asia should be vigilant on this issue. In
general, though, the Round seems unlikely to produce
significant relief from burdensome institutional requirements.
3. Rethinking reciprocity
The Declaration included significant commitments on reciprocity,
but did not undertake any fundamental rethinking of the concept or
introduce any innovative rationales. The Declaration adopted the
principles of SDT embodied in prior GATT/WTO instruments (paras.
44, 50). It reiterated that DCs should not be required to make fully
reciprocal cuts in tariffs or other trade barriers (para. 16), and it made
similar provisions in specific areas, e.g., agriculture (para. 13) and
investment (para. 22). Yet it still called for “an overall balance in the
outcome of the negotiations” (para. 49).
Some early negotiations, such as agriculture, have given effect
to the principle that DCs should be allowed reduced commitments and
longer transition periods, although few of these negotiations have
progressed very far (ICTSD/IISD 2003b, 3). In other areas, however,
some leading proposals seem to run afoul of the principle. This is true
of the US proposal for the two-stage elimination of industrial tariffs,
which would on the whole require larger reductions by DCs.64 The EU
proposal to compress tariff rates into a narrow band would have a
similar effect, although the EU also proposes some forms of SDT.
While market liberalization is in the long-run interest of DCs in Asia,
these countries should at least hold out for adequate transition periods
linked to progress in development.
DCs argue that many SDT provisions in WTO instruments have
been ineffective because they require only “best endeavors” (ICTSD/




IISD 2003k, 1). To deal with this problem, the Declaration instructed
the CTD to review all SDT provisions with a view to making them more
precise, effective, and operational, although not necessarily mandatory
(para. 44).65 The CTD, however, has been unable to meet its deadlines
for submitting “clear recommendations.” It remains sharply divided on
many issues, most fundamentally its own mandate.
DCs argue that existing instruments must be amended to make
SDT provisions more effective. Under the Declaration and
Implementation Decision, they argue, revisions should be made outside
the single undertaking negotiations, with no new concessions required.
ICs consider that the amendment of legal instruments would change
the balance of obligations and would thus require equivalent
concessions. However, they insist that the CTD lacks a mandate for
such negotiations; these must take place in the negotiating bodies of
the Round.66 The CTD requested the General Council to clarify its
mandate, but it has been unable to do so (WTO 2003a). Requiring new
concessions for improvements in SDT seems contrary to the purpose
of the review, but ICs will resist formal amendments without them, due
to the precedential effect as well as the impact of specific changes. How
this standoff is resolved will go far to determining the success of the
DDA.
4. SDT and flexibility
Critics further emphasize the need for SDT provisions that allow
DC governments to experiment with domestic institutions and
intervene in markets to promote development and poverty alleviation.
The Declaration, though, included few if any provisions on these
matters, and the early, inconclusive deliberations on SDT have not
addressed them either. In fact, DCs have effectively kept the expansion
of SDT concepts off the table in the CTD, the primary venue on the
65 Implementation Decision para. 12 also addressed existing SDT provisions. Among other things,
it required the CTD to identify provisions that are or should be made mandatory and to consider
the implications of making non-binding provisions mandatory. The Declaration endorsed this work
program.
66 ICs also call for distinguishing among states at different stages of development for purposes of
SDT, and graduating those that reach higher levels.
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subject, by arguing that its deliberations should focus on strengthening
existing provisions.67
The Declaration by no means endorsed institutional
experimentation. Yet certain provisions could be read as accepting
national variation. On trade and investment, for example, the
Declaration noted that any agreed framework should take due account
of development needs; DCs should only be expected to make
commitments commensurate with their circumstances (para. 22). On
trade and competition, while the Declaration emphasized “progressive
reinforcement of competition institutions” in DCs, it provided that
negotiations should take account of their special needs and provide
“appropriate flexibility” (para. 25). It also highlighted the right to
regulate services (para. 7) and investment (para. 22) in the public
interest. Early discussions have added little to these provisions, but DCs
in Asia should insist that they be carried out in future negotiations.
5. Trade issues of special interest to DCs and LDCs
 Numerous operative provisions in the Declaration single out the
special situation of DCs. The DDA includes negotiations on
implementation and other subjects of special concern, as well as
deliberations on SDT, TOT, and the relationship of trade to debt and
finance (ICTSD/IISD 2003h). At this early stage, however, few of these
discussions have borne fruit. As most DCs demanded, the Declaration
also reaffirmed the Singapore decision to leave labor standards to the
International Labour Organization (para. 8) and authorized only limited
negotiations on trade and environment (paras. 31-32).
The Declaration was silent on the problems of commodity
exporters except for a reference to “diversification” of LDC exports and
a reaffirmation of undertakings from the Third UN Conference on
LDCs (para. 42). The Africa Group has raised many commodity issues
in the Working Group on Trade, Debt, and Finance, including the need
to enhance market access, reduce the risks of fluctuations in prices and
67 In part this tactic has been aimed at preventing the introduction of restrictive concepts like
graduation into the deliberations (ICTSD/IISD 2003k).
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currencies, and support diversification and supply development.68 India
and other DCs also call for commodity policies that help DCs with
heavy debt loads (ICTSD/IISD 2003h, 2). Most important, leading
proposals in the market access negotiations seek everything but arms
access for LDCs. These should be the focus of efforts by LDCs in Asia.
6. Food security and rural development
The Declaration did not incorporate the World Food Summit
definition of “food security” or adopt it as a central element of trade
policy. However, it did explicitly recognize the issue. Para. 13 provided
that SDT would be an integral part of the agriculture negotiations, to
be included in national commitments and “as appropriate” in WTO
rules “to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their
development needs, including food security and rural development.”69
In early negotiations, the Like-Minded Group proposes that DCs
be allowed to exempt products crucial to food security from new tariff
reductions and to renegotiate low bound tariff rates on food (ICTSD/
IISD 2003b, 2). The Chair’s proposals, although not accepted, also
envisage lesser tariff reductions on a limited number of products
designated as important to DC food security. These proposals have
stimulated considerable interest, along with sharp debate over governing
criteria, with India and other DCs arguing for broad eligibility and the
Cairns Group and the US demanding stringent restrictions (ICTSD
2003b). Food security has also entered into discussions of SSG for DC
agriculture.70 Even with relatively tight criteria, both mechanisms would
be beneficial to DCs in Asia.
The Declaration addressed other issues relevant to rural
development. It reiterated the “long-term objective” of correcting and
68 Some DCs, including Malaysia, resist discussing matters like supply development, regarding
them as internal issues that should be kept off the WTO agenda.
69 The Declaration set a target date of March 31, 2003 to establish modalities for SDT in this
context, as well as for the agricultural negotiations as a whole.  Setting a target date was seen
as a significant advance over the framework for built-in negotiations on agriculture under the
AoA. However, in a serious setback for the Round, the March 31 deadline was not met, creating
a domino effect in other areas.
70 In addition to the much-discussed new SSG, Indonesia and the Philippines, among others, have
broached the idea of a “food security mechanism” (ICTSD/IISD 2003b, 3).
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preventing distortions in world agricultural markets. It committed
members to comprehensive negotiations aimed – without prejudicing
the outcome – at reducing, “with a view to phasing out,” all forms of
export subsidy71 and substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic
support (para. 13).72 Leading proposals envisage the phase-out of
export subsidies within a relatively short time (ICTSD/IISD 2003b, 3),
although it will be difficult to garner EU agreement. Phasing out export
subsidies would be of great benefit to DCs in Asia, many of which are
actual or potential agricultural exporters. In the long run, even those
that currently depend on subsidized food imports could benefit through
the stimulation of domestic production. DCs and the “friends of
multifunctionality” also propose expanding the green box to
encompass support measures aimed at food security.73 These could
also be beneficial to DCs in Asia, but they should be cautious about
supporting multifunctionality because of its impact on market access.
7. Coordination with development regimes
The Declaration included some steps to enhance policy
coordination, though fewer than critics recommend. The strongest
statement appeared in para. 5, which declared that states cannot
address the challenges they face in today’s dynamic environment
through trade policy alone. Ministers thus agreed to work with the
Bretton Woods institutions for greater coherence in global economic
policy. As discussed earlier, the Declaration also included provisions
designed to promote coherence in TA and other forms of aid.
Of course, coherence alone is not enough; policies must prioritize
development. The Working Group on Trade, Debt, and Finance,
71 The formulation “all forms of export subsidy” was a compromise between the US position that
the negotiations should focus on export subsidies and the EU position that they should encompass
all forms of export support, including programs such as export credits and food aid.
72 While the explicit mention of “trade-distorting” subsidies would seem to limit negotiations to
those measures included under the “amber box” of the AoA, some agricultural exporting states
argue that it could be read to authorize discussion of all forms of domestic support, including
those under the “green” (only minimally distorting) and “blue” (moderately distorting but temporarily
unregulated) boxes of the AoA.
73 The EU has also proposed adding to the AoA a “food security box” that would create an SSG
for DCs and authorize increased flexibility for domestic support (ICTSD/IISD 2003b, 3-4).
Implementation Decision para. 2.1 already urges restraint in challenging Green Box measures
aimed at food security and notified by DCs.
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outside the single undertaking negotiations, is to consider ways to
strengthen the coherence of trade and financial policies (para. 36). IDOs
and other economic organizations have made presentations to the
Group, although few proposals have been submitted. DCs including
PRC, India, and Pakistan propose a more development-oriented
framework for the entire global economic system (ICTSD/IISD 2003h).
D. Potential Benefits
At this point, only a few areas of the Doha negotiations seem
capable of producing major economic benefits for DCs. Consider the
seven subjects of the single undertaking negotiations identified earlier:
 Services negotiations will likely produce little progress on
movement of low-skill workers, the most important issue for
DCs. Negotiations should lead to valuable liberalization of
services by DCs. However, it remains unclear whether DCs
will be allowed to liberalize and regulate with the degree of
caution and flexibility recommended by development
specialists.
 Negotiations on WTO rules seem unlikely to generate much
if any relief from contingent protection.
 Negotiations and deliberations on SDT and implementation
will produce some gains, but these may come at the cost of
new concessions. Some of the major imbalances in WTO
agreements are not on the agenda.
 The trade and environment negotiations are substantively
narrow and are of low priority to most DCs.
Thus, agriculture and market access for industrial products, widely
acknowledged to be the core of the Round, will have to produce the
major gains.
In the market access negotiations, the nature of the final bargain
will depend crucially on the extent to which negotiators take the special
circumstances of DCs into account. Greater access to IC markets –
especially through reduction of tariffs on labor-intensive products,
peaks, and escalation – would be a major benefit to DCs. Reducing DC
tariffs would also provide development benefits, giving poor residents
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greater access to inexpensive goods and expanding South-South trade.
However, if DCs are required to make tariff concessions on the same
scale and schedule as ICs, as under the US zero tariff proposal, it would
create hardships for DC governments, vulnerable sectors, and workers
(Medhora 2001). In addition, it remains to be seen whether negotiators
can find a way to preserve some trade preference margins for LDCs
while reducing IC tariffs.
Significant progress on agriculture is crucial to the success of the
Round. Each major area of the negotiation – market access, domestic
support, and export subsidies – can produce significant benefits to DCs.
Yet here too it remains unclear how the special concerns of DCs will
be addressed. Early negotiations have revealed strong differences on
many significant issues, including the size and timing of DC market
access commitments, protection of preference margins, green box
treatment for development measures, and food security and safeguard
mechanisms. Proposals to allow DCs to designate a limited number of
products important to food security, which would be subject to lowered
tariff reduction commitments, safeguards, or other interventions, are
a creative way to reconcile development needs with the benefits of
liberalization.
Although it is crucial for the market access and agriculture
negotiations that the special needs of DCs be addressed, these
countries’ interests are divided on both sets of issues, making unified
negotiating positions difficult to achieve. In both areas, the issue of
trade preferences sets LDCs against more advanced DCs. In agriculture,
exporting countries in the Cairns Group favor widespread liberalization
of tariffs and NTBs, while other DCs, even those in the Like-Minded
Group, seek to preserve some ability to protect vulnerable sectors in
the interest of food security and rural development. Exporter groupings
favor banning export subsidies, while some DCs that rely on
inexpensive food imports fear their loss. Exporters also favor stricter
limits on domestic support, while other DCs seek to expand the green
box for development purposes.
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CONCLUSION: POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE
The Declaration addressed many of the concerns raised by
development advocates. It was especially responsive to
recommendations on market access and aid for trade,74 which are
consistent with the WTO’s traditional trade liberalization focus. It also
authorized consideration of the implementation agenda and SDT
enhancement, although it either required new concessions for action
in these areas or left the requirement ambiguous.
On other issues, though, the Declaration fell short of advocates’
recommendations. In general, in spite of strong rhetoric, it did not
adopt development as the guiding principle of the regime or make the
WTO a strong advocate for development. More specifically, it failed to
address areas such as domestic DC reform, imbalances in agreements
like TRIPS, domestic institutional variation, WTO governance, and
(with some exceptions)75 coordinating with IDOs and specialized
agencies on deprivations like hunger and disease. It left other significant
issues, like TOT and the problems of LDCs, to weak procedures.
The early negotiations are also troubling. Although these are still
early days, negotiators are deadlocked on major subjects, including
agriculture (where the stalemate has affected other areas), contingent
protection, and dispute settlement. Equally serious, members appear
reluctant to give concrete effect to development commitments in the
Declaration. Discussions on SDT, implementation, TRIPS and public
health, and other important subjects are deadlocked, primarily between
DCs and ICs. At this stage, many of the disputes concern threshold
issues like mandates and modalities. Influential members are holding
out for procedures that would hamper adoption of pro-development
measures (e.g., limiting the TOT Working Group to general
discussions) or increase their cost (e.g., requiring new concessions for
action on SDT and the full implementation agenda).
There is still time for negotiators, trade officials, and development
practitioners and advocates to bring the insights and recommendations
74 Concrete WTO activities in the field of TA reinforce these provisions.
75 These include the TRIPS Declaration, support for collaboration on TA, and language on policy
coherence with the Bretton Woods institutions.
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of development policy – as reflected in the instruments reviewed at
the outset of this paper and the rhetoric of the Declaration itself – closer
to the heart of the Doha trade negotiations. But how can this be done?
The rhetoric of the Declaration is not self-implementing; political
action is required to give it effect. Since even DCs in Asia have differing
interests on particular issues, it is not possible to suggest specific tactics
for individual governments. But the remainder of this section identifies
two general strategies – each with two distinct forms reflecting different
political “logics” – that could prove effective for development advocates
at this time.76 The two strategies are bargaining and public diplomacy;
each strategy can be pursued on the basis of interests and on the basis
of norms. DCs and development advocates in Asia and elsewhere
should deploy these strategies in support of action on the issues most
important to them – be they industrial tariffs, agricultural export
subsidies, contingent protection, TRIPS and public health,
implementation, SDT, or everything but arms.
Obviously, hard bargaining in Doha negotiating bodies and other
forums is the most direct way to affect the progress of the Round. DCs
have ongoing bargaining leverage in many areas of the DDA, but the
best single opportunity for bargaining will come in September, at the
Cancun ministerial conference. Under the Declaration (para. 45), this
ministerial is to “take stock of progress in the negotiations, provide any
necessary political guidance, and take decisions as necessary.”
Ministers will likely be asked to break stalemates in several important
areas, including agriculture. If the Round is completed on schedule by
January 1, 2005, Cancun will be the last ministerial before the special
session called to conclude the negotiations, so its decisions will be
crucial.
The clearest opportunity for interest-based bargaining arises
from the procedure for addressing the Singapore issues. In each case,
due to DC resistance, ministers at Doha agreed (paras. 20, 23, 26-27)
76 As these are political strategies, they derive from political science and international relations theory
more than from economics or law. For a brief presentation of relevant theories of international
relations, see Abbott (1999).  On the political “logics” discussed here – the “logic of consequences”
and the “logic of appropriateness” – see March and Olsen (1989).
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that “negotiations will take place after the [Cancun ministerial] on the
basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session
on modalities of negotiations.” These are “arguably the most confusing
provisions of the Ministerial Declaration” (ICTSD 2001, 6). ICs argue
that the quoted language authorizes negotiations; the only open
question is their modalities. Most DCs argue that it does not authorize
negotiations; these can only take place if members make a consensus
decision as to modalities. DCs have significant leverage in either case.77
DCs in Asia should (jointly to the extent possible) identify the issues
most important to them and prepare to drive hard bargains on those
issues in return for consent to negotiations or modalities on the
Singapore issues.
Interest-based tradeoffs are not the only form of bargaining,
although they are typical of trade negotiations. Negotiations can also
involve normative bargaining: debate over the kinds of behavior that
are appropriate in a given situation. Such bargaining turns on
persuasion. Interest-based persuasion involves providing information
that encourages action by others, under their preexisting preferences.
But normative persuasion involves attempting to convince others to
adopt new understandings of how they should behave.
Normative persuasion usually turns on appeals to principles and
norms that all consider legitimate.78 As noted at the outset, the summit
declarations and other commitments adopted around the turn of the
millennium “constitute a coherent and legitimate set of global norms
on development, solemnly endorsed at the highest levels of
government.” These instruments provide both a road map for efforts
to persuade and a powerful source of normative legitimacy.
Development advocates should actively invoke these coherent global
norms in Doha negotiating bodies and in any other forums where
pressure can be applied. In the Round itself, DC negotiators must be
the primary persuaders. In broader forums, however, representatives
of IDOs, NGOs, and individual development specialists may be in a
position to make these arguments to trade officials and other leaders.
77 Early stages of the Round have clearly demonstrated that negotiations over modalities can shape
or block substantive negotiations.
78 For a discussion of normative persuasion, see Abbott and Snidal (2002).
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Public diplomacy seems somewhat foreign to the secretive
negotiations characteristic of the WTO, but advocates on trade issues
from agriculture to IPR have always appealed to wider publics to garner
support for their positions. Development advocates have done the
same, but in recent years their public diplomacy has been more
effectively connected to discussions of foreign assistance and
pharmaceutical pricing than to the Round.
Interest-based public diplomacy involves showing interest
groups and concerned individuals in the public at large how pro-
development actions would benefit them, in the hope that they will
demand such actions from their leaders. Examples might include
campaigns to educate consumers about the benefits of low-priced
imports from DCs, taxpayers about the costs of agricultural export
subsidies, or business interests about the export potential of more
highly developed Southern markets. Press coverage is typically central
to such campaigns. Public education efforts can take place in the
advocates’ own countries, or in other states whose decisions are
essential in the Round.
Norm-based public diplomacy is widely practiced by human
rights and environmental groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998). These
advocates appeal to wider publics, typically by framing issues to capture
public attention and invoking widely accepted normative principles. A
central strategy is “shaming:” publicizing the failure of target actors to
observe accepted norms, especially those they profess to follow, and
mobilizing public pressure to do so. Norm-based public diplomacy is
responsible for much of the recent progress on TRIPS and public
health, and it could be productive on many other development issues.
Indeed, norm-based public diplomacy seems potentially more fruitful
than norm-based bargaining in the WTO.79 Even the tactic of shaming
is feasible, since so many heads of state and government have accepted
the recent global commitments on development. Public attention can
only be captured intermittently, however, so advocates must plan their
efforts carefully.
79 For the most part, WTO processes have avoided normative debate, instead reducing issues to
technical or economic questions (Abbott 2001).
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These political strategies are far from foolproof. At this point,
however, they are the most effective approaches for development
advocates who seek to give concrete effect to the rhetorical promise
of the Declaration and the DDA.
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Doha, 9 - 14 November 2001
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
Adopted on 14 November 2001
1. The multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade
Organization has contributed significantly to economic growth,
development and employment throughout the past fifty years. We are
determined, particularly in the light of the global economic slowdown,
to maintain the process of reform and liberalization of trade policies,
thus ensuring that the system plays its full part in promoting recovery,
growth and development. We therefore strongly reaffirm the principles
and objectives set out in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, and pledge to reject the use of protectionism.
2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of
economic development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the
need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority
of WTO Members are developing countries. We seek to place
their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted
* Reprinted with kind permission from the World Trade Organization.
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in this Declaration. Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh
Agreement, we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to
ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed
among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development. In this context,
enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably
financed technical assistance and capacity-building programmes have
important roles to play.
3. We recognize the particular vulnerability of the least-developed
countries and the special structural difficulties they face in the global
economy. We are committed to addressing the marginalization of least-
developed countries in international trade and to improving their
effective participation in the multilateral trading system. We recall the
commitments made by Ministers at our meetings in Marrakesh,
Singapore and Geneva, and by the international community at the Third
UN Conference on Least-Developed Countries in Brussels, to help least-
developed countries secure beneficial and meaningful integration into the
multilateral trading system and the global economy. We are determined
that the WTO will play its part in building effectively on these
commitments under the Work Programme we are establishing.
4. We stress our commitment to the WTO as the unique forum for
global trade rule-making and liberalization, while also recognizing that
regional trade agreements can play an important role in promoting the
liberalization and expansion of trade and in fostering development.
5. We are aware that the challenges Members face in a rapidly
changing international environment cannot be addressed through
measures taken in the trade field alone. We shall continue to work with
the Bretton Woods institutions for greater coherence in global
economic policy-making.
6. We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of
sustainable development, as stated in the Preamble to the Marrakesh
Agreement. We are convinced that the aims of upholding and
safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading
system, and acting for the protection of the environment and the
promotion of sustainable development can and must be mutually
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supportive.  We take note of the efforts by Members to conduct national
environmental assessments of trade policies on a voluntary basis. We
recognize that under WTO rules no country should be prevented from
taking measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, or of the environment at the levels it considers appropriate,
subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with
the provisions of the WTO Agreements. We welcome the WTO´s
continued cooperation with UNEP and other inter-governmental
environmental organizations. We encourage efforts to promote
cooperation between the WTO and relevant international environmental
and developmental organizations, especially in the lead-up to the World
Summit on Sustainable Development to be held in Johannesburg, South
Africa, in September 2002.
7. We reaffirm the right of Members under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services to regulate, and to introduce new
regulations on, the supply of services.
8. We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial
Conference regarding internationally recognized core labour standards.
We take note of work under way in the International Labour
Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globalization.
9. We note with particular satisfaction that this Conference has
completed the WTO accession procedures for China and Chinese
Taipei. We also welcome the accession as new Members, since our last
Session, of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Lithuania, Moldova and
Oman, and note the extensive market-access commitments already
made by these countries on accession. These accessions will greatly
strengthen the multilateral trading system, as will those of the 28
countries now negotiating their accession. We therefore attach great
importance to concluding accession proceedings as quickly as possible.
In particular, we are committed to accelerating the accession of least-
developed countries.
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10. Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO
membership, we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure internal
transparency and the effective participation of all Members. While
emphasizing the intergovernmental character of the organization, we are
committed to making the WTO’s operations more transparent, including
through more effective and prompt dissemination of information, and
to improve dialogue with the public. We shall therefore at the national
and multilateral levels continue to promote a better public understanding
of the WTO and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, rules-based
multilateral trading system.
11. In view of these considerations, we hereby agree to undertake
the broad and balanced Work Programme set out below. This
incorporates both an expanded negotiating agenda and other important
decisions and activities necessary to address the challenges facing the
multilateral trading system.
WORK PROGRAMME
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns
12. We attach the utmost importance to the implementation-related
issues and concerns raised by Members and are determined to find
appropriate solutions to them. In this connection, and having regard to
the General Council Decisions of 3 May and 15 December 2000, we
further adopt the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns in document WT/MIN(01)/17 to address a number of
implementation problems faced by Members. We agree that negotiations
on outstanding implementation issues shall be an integral part of the
Work Programme we are establishing, and that agreements reached at
an early stage in these negotiations shall be treated in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 47 below. In this regard, we shall proceed
as follows: (a) where we provide a specific negotiating mandate in this
Declaration, the relevant implementation issues shall be addressed under
that mandate; (b) the other outstanding implementation issues shall be
addressed as a matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies, which
shall report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, established under




13. We recognize the work already undertaken in the negotiations
initiated in early 2000 under Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture,
including the large number of negotiating proposals submitted on behalf
of a total of 121 Members. We recall the long-term objective referred
to in the Agreement to establish a fair and market-oriented trading
system through a programme of fundamental reform encompassing
strengthened rules and specific commitments on support and protection
in order to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets. We reconfirm our commitment to this programme.
Building on the work carried out to date and without prejudging the
outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive
negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access;
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies;
and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. We agree
that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be
an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be
embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments and as
appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be
operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively
take account of their development needs, including food security and
rural development. We take note of the non-trade concerns reflected in
the negotiating proposals submitted by Members and confirm that non-
trade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided
for in the Agreement on Agriculture.
14. Modalities for the further commitments, including provisions for
special and differential treatment, shall be established no later than 31
March 2003. Participants shall submit their comprehensive draft
Schedules based on these modalities no later than the date of the Fifth
Session of the Ministerial Conference. The negotiations, including with
respect to rules and disciplines and related legal texts, shall be concluded
as part and at the date of conclusion of the negotiating agenda as a
whole.
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Services
15. The negotiations on trade in services shall be conducted with a
view to promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the
development of developing and least-developed countries. We recognize
the work already undertaken in the negotiations, initiated in January
2000 under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
and the large number of proposals submitted by Members on a wide
range of sectors and several horizontal issues, as well as on movement
of natural persons. We reaffirm the Guidelines and Procedures for the
Negotiations adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 28 March
2001 as the basis for continuing the negotiations, with a view to
achieving the objectives of the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
as stipulated in the Preamble, Article IV and Article XIX of that
Agreement. Participants shall submit initial requests for specific
commitments by 30 June 2002 and initial offers by 31 March 2003.
Market Access for Non-agricultural Products
16. We agree to negotiations which shall aim, by modalities to be
agreed, to reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the
reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation,
as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products of export interest
to developing countries. Product coverage shall be comprehensive and
without a priori exclusions. The negotiations shall take fully into account
the special needs and interests of developing and least-developed
country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in
reduction commitments, in accordance with the relevant provisions of
Article XXVIII bis of GATT 1994 and the provisions cited in paragraph
50 below. To this end, the modalities to be agreed will include
appropriate studies and capacity-building measures to assist least-
developed countries to participate effectively in the negotiations.
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
17. We stress the importance we attach to implementation and
interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner supportive of public
health, by promoting both access to existing medicines and research
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and development into new medicines and, in this connection, are
adopting a separate Declaration.
18. With a view to completing the work started in the Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Council for
TRIPS) on the implementation of Article 23.4, we agree to negotiate the
establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of
geographical indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference. We note that issues related to the extension of
the protection of geographical indications provided for in Article 23 to
products other than wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council
for TRIPS pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Declaration.
19. We instruct the Council for TRIPS, in pursuing its work
programme including under the review of Article 27.3(b), the review of
the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the
work foreseen pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Declaration, to
examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and
the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional
knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments raised by
Members pursuant to Article 71.1. In undertaking this work, the TRIPS
Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles
7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the
development dimension.
Relationship between Trade and Investment
20. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border
investment, particularly foreign direct investment, that will contribute to
the expansion of trade, and the need for enhanced technical assistance
and capacity-building in this area as referred to in paragraph 21, we
agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit
consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations.
21. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed
countries for enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity
building in this area, including policy analysis and development so that
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they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral
cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human
and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in cooperation
with other relevant intergovernmental organisations, including
UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to
provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond
to these needs.
22. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment will focus on
the clarification of: scope and definition; transparency; non-
discrimination; modalities for pre-establishment commitments based on
a GATS-type, positive list approach; development provisions; exceptions
and balance-of-payments safeguards; consultation and the settlement of
disputes between Members. Any framework should reflect in a balanced
manner the interests of home and host countries, and take due account
of the development policies and objectives of host governments as well
as their right to regulate in the public interest. The special development,
trade and financial needs of developing and least-developed countries
should be taken into account as an integral part of any framework, which
should enable Members to undertake obligations and commitments
commensurate with their individual needs and circumstances. Due regard
should be paid to other relevant WTO provisions. Account should be
taken, as appropriate, of existing bilateral and regional arrangements on
investment.
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy
23. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to enhance
the contribution of competition policy to international trade and
development, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and
capacity-building in this area as referred to in paragraph 24, we agree
that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus,
at that Session on modalities of negotiations.
24. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed
countries for enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity
building in this area, including policy analysis and development so that
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they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral
cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human
and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in cooperation
with other relevant intergovernmental organisations, including
UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to
provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond
to these needs.
25. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy will
focus on the clarification of: core principles, including transparency,
non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore
cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive
reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through
capacity building. Full account shall be taken of the needs of developing
and least-developed country participants and appropriate flexibility
provided to address them.
Transparency in Government Procurement
26. Recognizing the case for a multilateral agreement on
transparency in government procurement and the need for enhanced
technical assistance and capacity building in this area, we agree that
negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus,
at that Session on modalities of negotiations. These negotiations will
build on the progress made in the Working Group on Transparency in
Government Procurement by that time and take into account
participants’ development priorities, especially those of least-developed
country participants. Negotiations shall be limited to the transparency
aspects and therefore will not restrict the scope for countries to give
preferences to domestic supplies and suppliers. We commit ourselves
to ensuring adequate technical assistance and support for capacity
building both during the negotiations and after their conclusion.
Trade Facilitation
27. Recognizing the case for further expediting the movement,
release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit, and the need
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for enhanced technical assistance and capacity building in this area, we
agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit
consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations. In the period
until the Fifth Session, the Council for Trade in Goods shall review and
as appropriate, clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII
and X of the GATT 1994 and identify the trade facilitation needs and
priorities of Members, in particular developing and least-developed
countries.  We commit ourselves to ensuring adequate technical
assistance and support for capacity building in this area.
WTO Rules
28. In the light of experience and of the increasing application of
these instruments by Members, we agree to negotiations aimed at
clarifying and improving disciplines under the Agreements on
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, while preserving the basic concepts, principles
and effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and
objectives, and taking into account the needs of developing and least-
developed participants. In the initial phase of the negotiations,
participants will indicate the provisions, including disciplines on trade
distorting practices, that they seek to clarify and improve in the
subsequent phase. In the context of these negotiations, participants shall
also aim to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies,
taking into account the importance of this sector to developing
countries. We note that fisheries subsidies are also referred to in
paragraph 31.
29. We also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying
to regional trade agreements. The negotiations shall take into account
the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.
Dispute Settlement Understanding
30. We agree to negotiations on improvements and clarifications of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The negotiations should be
based on the work done thus far as well as any additional proposals by
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Members, and aim to agree on improvements and clarifications not later
than May 2003, at which time we will take steps to ensure that the
results enter into force as soon as possible thereafter.
Trade and Environment
31. With a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and
environment, we agree to negotiations, without prejudging their
outcome, on:
(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific
trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs). The negotiations shall be limited in
scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as
among parties to the MEA in question. The negotiations
shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that
is not a party to the MEA in question;
(ii) procedures for regular information exchange between
MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and
the criteria for the granting of observer status;
(iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services.
We note that fisheries subsidies form part of the negotiations provided
for in paragraph 28.
32. We instruct the Committee on Trade and Environment, in
pursuing work on all items on its agenda within its current terms of
reference, to give particular attention to:
(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access,
especially in relation to developing countries, in particular
the least-developed among them, and those situations in
which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions
and distortions would benefit trade, the environment and
development;
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(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and
(iii) labelling requirements for environmental purposes.
Work on these issues should include the identification of any need to
clarify relevant WTO rules. The Committee shall report to the Fifth
Session of the Ministerial Conference, and make recommendations,
where appropriate, with respect to future action, including the desirability
of negotiations. The outcome of this work as well as the negotiations
carried out under paragraph 31(i) and (ii) shall be compatible with the
open and non-discriminatory nature of the multilateral trading system,
shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members under
existing WTO agreements, in particular the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, nor alter the
balance of these rights and obligations, and will take into account the
needs of developing and least-developed countries.
33. We recognize the importance of technical assistance and
capacity building in the field of trade and environment to developing
countries, in particular the least-developed among them. We also
encourage that expertise and experience be shared with Members
wishing to perform environmental reviews at the national level. A report
shall be prepared on these activities for the Fifth Session.
Electronic Commerce
34. We take note of the work which has been done in the General
Council and other relevant bodies since the Ministerial Declaration of 20
May 1998 and agree to continue the Work Programme on Electronic
Commerce. The work to date demonstrates that electronic commerce
creates new challenges and opportunities for trade for Members at all
stages of development, and we recognize the importance of creating
and maintaining an environment which is favourable to the future
development of electronic commerce. We instruct the General Council
to consider the most appropriate institutional arrangements for handling
the Work Programme, and to report on further progress to the Fifth
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Session of the Ministerial Conference. We declare that Members will
maintain their current practice of not imposing customs duties on
electronic transmissions until the Fifth Session.
Small Economies
35. We agree to a work programme, under the auspices of the
General Council, to examine issues relating to the trade of small
economies. The objective of this work is to frame responses to the
trade-related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable
economies into the multilateral trading system, and not to create a sub-
category of WTO Members. The General Council shall review the work
programme and make recommendations for action to the Fifth Session
of the Ministerial Conference.
Trade, Debt and Finance
36. We agree to an examination, in a Working Group under the
auspices of the General Council, of the relationship between trade, debt
and finance, and of any possible recommendations on steps that might
be taken within the mandate and competence of the WTO to enhance
the capacity of the multilateral trading system to contribute to a durable
solution to the problem of external indebtedness of developing and least-
developed countries, and to strengthen the coherence of international
trade and financial policies, with a view to safeguarding the multilateral
trading system from the effects of financial and monetary instability. The
General Council shall report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference on progress in the examination.
Trade and Transfer of Technology
37. We agree to an examination, in a Working Group under the
auspices of the General Council, of the relationship between trade and
transfer of technology, and of any possible recommendations on steps
that might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to increase flows
of technology to developing countries. The General Council shall report
to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on progress in the
examination.
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Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building
38. We confirm that technical cooperation and capacity building are
core elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading
system, and we welcome and endorse the New Strategy for WTO
Technical Cooperation for Capacity Building, Growth and Integration.
We instruct the Secretariat, in coordination with other relevant agencies,
to support domestic efforts for mainstreaming trade into national plans
for economic development and strategies for poverty reduction. The
delivery of WTO technical assistance shall be designed to assist
developing and least-developed countries and low-income countries in
transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines, implement obligations
and exercise the rights of membership, including drawing on the benefits
of an open, rules-based multilateral trading system. Priority shall also be
accorded to small, vulnerable, and transition economies, as well as to
Members and Observers without representation in Geneva. We reaffirm
our support for the valuable work of the International Trade Centre,
which should be enhanced.
39. We underscore the urgent necessity for the effective coordinated
delivery of technical assistance with bilateral donors, in the OECD
Development Assistance Committee and relevant international and
regional intergovernmental institutions, within a coherent policy
framework and timetable. In the coordinated delivery of technical
assistance, we instruct the Director-General to consult with the relevant
agencies, bilateral donors and beneficiaries, to identify ways of
enhancing and rationalizing the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related
Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries and the Joint
Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP).
40. We agree that there is a need for technical assistance to benefit
from secure and predictable funding. We therefore instruct the
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration to develop a plan
for adoption by the General Council in December 2001 that will ensure
long-term funding for WTO technical assistance at an overall level no




41. We have established firm commitments on technical
cooperation and capacity building in various paragraphs in this Ministerial
Declaration. We reaffirm these specific commitments contained in
paragraphs 16, 21, 24, 26, 27, 33, 38-40, 42 and 43, and also reaffirm
the understanding in paragraph 2 on the important role of sustainably
financed technical assistance and capacity-building programmes. We
instruct the Director-General to report to the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference, with an interim report to the General Council
in December 2002 on the implementation and adequacy of these
commitments in the identified paragraphs.
Least-Developed Countries
42. We acknowledge the seriousness of the concerns expressed by
the least-developed countries (LDCs) in the Zanzibar Declaration adopted
by their Ministers in July 2001. We recognize that the integration of the
LDCs into the multilateral trading system requires meaningful market
access, support for the diversification of their production and export
base, and trade-related technical assistance and capacity building. We
agree that the meaningful integration of LDCs into the trading system
and the global economy will involve efforts by all WTO Members. We
commit ourselves to the objective of duty-free, quota-free market access
for products originating from LDCs. In this regard, we welcome the
significant market access improvements by WTO Members in advance
of the Third UN Conference on LDCs (LDC-III), in Brussels, May 2001.
We further commit ourselves to consider additional measures for
progressive improvements in market access for LDCs. Accession of
LDCs remains a priority for the Membership. We agree to work to
facilitate and accelerate negotiations with acceding LDCs. We instruct the
Secretariat to reflect the priority we attach to LDCs’ accessions in the
annual plans for technical assistance. We reaffirm the commitments we
undertook at LDC-III, and agree that the WTO should take into account,
in designing its work programme for LDCs, the trade-related elements
of the Brussels Declaration and Programme of Action, consistent with
the WTO’s mandate, adopted at LDC-III. We instruct the Sub-Committee
for Least-Developed Countries to design such a work programme and
to report on the agreed work programme to the General Council at its
first meeting in 2002.
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43. We endorse the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related
Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries (IF) as a viable model
for LDCs’ trade development. We urge development partners to
significantly increase contributions to the IF Trust Fund and WTO extra-
budgetary trust funds in favour of LDCs. We urge the core agencies, in
coordination with development partners, to explore the enhancement
of the IF with a view to addressing the supply-side constraints of LDCs
and the extension of the model to all LDCs, following the review of the
IF and the appraisal of the ongoing Pilot Scheme in selected LDCs. We
request the Director-General, following coordination with heads of the
other agencies, to provide an interim report to the General Council in
December 2002 and a full report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference on all issues affecting LDCs.
Special and Differential Treatment
44. We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment
are an integral part of the WTO Agreements. We note the concerns
expressed regarding their operation in addressing specific constraints
faced by developing countries, particularly least-developed countries. In
that connection, we also note that some Members have proposed a
Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment (WT/
GC/W/442). We therefore agree that all special and differential
treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them
and making them more precise, effective and operational. In this
connection, we endorse the work programme on special and differential
treatment set out in the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE
WORK PROGRAMME
45. The negotiations to be pursued under the terms of this
Declaration shall be concluded not later than 1 January 2005. The Fifth
Session of the Ministerial Conference will take stock of progress in the
negotiations, provide any necessary political guidance, and take
decisions as necessary. When the results of the negotiations in all areas
have been established, a Special Session of the Ministerial Conference
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will be held to take decisions regarding the adoption and
implementation of those results.
46. The overall conduct of the negotiations shall be supervised by
a Trade Negotiations Committee under the authority of the General
Council. The Trade Negotiations Committee shall hold its first meeting
not later than 31 January 2002. It shall establish appropriate
negotiating mechanisms as required and supervise the progress of the
negotiations.
47. With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, the conduct, conclusion and entry
into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts
of a single undertaking. However, agreements reached at an early stage
may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Early
agreements shall be taken into account in assessing the overall balance
of the negotiations.
48. Negotiations shall be open to:
(i) all Members of the WTO; and
(ii) States and separate customs territories currently in the
process of accession and those that inform Members, at
a regular meeting of the General Council, of their
intention to negotiate the terms of their membership and
for whom an accession working party is established.
Decisions on the outcomes of the negotiations shall be taken only by
WTO Members.
49. The negotiations shall be conducted in a transparent manner
among participants, in order to facilitate the effective participation of all.
They shall be conducted with a view to ensuring benefits to all
participants and to achieving an overall balance in the outcome of the
negotiations.
50. The negotiations and the other aspects of the Work Programme
shall take fully into account the principle of special and differential
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treatment for developing and least-developed countries embodied in: Part
IV of the GATT 1994; the Decision of 28 November 1979 on
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries; the Uruguay Round Decision on
Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries; and all other relevant
WTO provisions.
51. The Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee
on Trade and Environment shall, within their respective mandates, each
act as a forum to identify and debate developmental and environmental
aspects of the negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of
having sustainable development appropriately reflected.
52. Those elements of the Work Programme which do not involve
negotiations are also accorded a high priority. They shall be pursued
under the overall supervision of the General Council, which shall report
on progress to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference.
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